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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of internal displacement has reached crisis
proportions.1 Internally displaced persons, according to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, are “persons who have been
forced to flee from their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large
numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic
violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters; and who
are within the territory of their own country.”2  Although this
                                                 
1. In 1982, 1.2 million persons were displaced in 11 countries.  See THE
FORSAKEN PEOPLE: CASE STUDIES OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED 1 (Roberta Cohen &
Francis M. Deng eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE FORSAKEN PEOPLE] (calling internal
displacement a global crisis, both “in dimension and magnitude”).  In 1997, the
number increased to more than 20 million in 35 countries.  See id.  The U.S.
Committee for Refugees cited over 17 million internally displaced persons in 1998.
See U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1999 [hereinafter WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY 1999] (providing statistics and detailed country reports regarding
refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons).
2. Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons,
Commission on Human Rights, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 11(a), at 17, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1992/23 (1992) (explaining in detail the definition of internally displaced
persons).  Criticism of this definition focuses on its under-inclusiveness.  See  ROBERTA
COHEN & FRANCIS M. DENG, MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT 17 (1998) (asserting that people who flee for the same reasons but in
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definition has existed since 1992, it cannot be found in any
internationally-binding treaty.3  Currently, internal conflict is credited
as the principle cause of the displacement of an estimated 10,000
people daily.4  Burundi, Rwanda, the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Columbia,
Tajikistan, and former republics of the Soviet Union, such as
Azerbaijan and Chechnya, are just a few of the countries with
internally displaced persons.5  Despite the global prevalence of
internal displacement, international efforts that have attempted to
assist displaced persons have been conducted, for the most part, on
an ad hoc basis entirely focused on providing humanitarian relief,
rather than legal protection of human rights.6
                                                 
small numbers, or who do not flee “suddenly or unexpectedly,” are not included in
the definition).  A broader definition was recently developed and presented by
Francis Deng, representative to the Secretary-General on internally displaced
persons:
Internally displaced persons or groups of persons who have been forced or
obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict,
situations of generalized violence, violence of human rights, or natural or
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized state border.
Report on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/
53/Add.2 (1998).  For Deng’s initial report, see U.N. Doc. E/CN/1996/52/Add.2
(1996).
3. Other definitions that exist include one utilized by the United Nations High
Commissioner on Refugees that only includes persons who have fled their homes
due to mass human rights violations and who do not receive their government’s full
protection.  See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 18 (noting the definition’s
inclusiveness and discussing other definitions of displaced persons) (citations
omitted).  An alternative definition is employed by the Permanent Consultation on
Internal Displacement in the Americas that applies only to those persons who are
internally displaced but would be refugees if they crossed their nation’s border.  See
id.
4. See G.A. Res. 558, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 112(c), ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
A/50/558 (1995) (asserting that in the post-Cold War era, internal conflicts are the
principal cause of displacement); see also COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 21 (citing
“conflict between a government and a minority” as one principal cause of internal
displacement according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees); Corinne E. Lewis,
Dealing with the Problem of Internally Displaced Persons, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 693, 699
(1992) (asserting that of all armed conflicts, 97% are internal and are the major
cause of internal displacement).
5. See THE FORSAKEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 2-3 (providing case studies of these
countries and others).  According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, internal
displacement, caused by persecution or armed conflict, is a current problem in the
following countries:  Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,
Bosnia and Hercegovina, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville,
Congo-Kinshasa, Croatia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru,
Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, and Yugoslavia.  See WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1999,
supra note 1, at 6.
6. See G.A. Res. 558, supra note 4, at Agenda Item 112(c), ¶ 8 (discussing the
necessity of a comprehensive approach to meeting the many needs of the internally
displaced).  Humanitarian relief includes the provision of food, shelter, medicine,
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Why should the international community respond at all?  Aside
from a sense of moral obligation, internal displacement causes
internal instability, which could spill across borders, causing a
“domino-effect” of regional instability.7  The internally displaced
often do not receive protection or assistance from the international
community because they physically remain within the domestic
jurisdiction of their nation and foreign sovereigns are reluctant to
intervene in these “internal matters.”8  Indeed, many times they do
not receive protection or assistance from their own government,
particularly when government action is the source of their
displacement.9  On multiple occasions, the United Nations Security
Council has justified international involvement primarily based on
the risk that an internal, refugee-creating environment will create a
stream of refugees10 seeking safe haven outside of their nation’s
borders.11  Since the end of the Cold War,12 the decreasing hospitality
                                                 
and other basic necessities by other nations.  See  COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 9-10
(discussing how the international community has focused solely on providing
humanitarian supplies to displaced populations).  But providing humanitarian relief
without protecting displaced persons from armed attack, disappearance, forcible
conscription, and sexual assault could lead to situations in which the displaced
population becomes the “well-fed dead.”  See id. at 10; see also G.A. Res. 558, supra
note 4, at Agenda Item 112(c), ¶¶ 7-8 (asserting that the internally displaced are
vulnerable and should be protected from violence as well as supplied with
humanitarian relief).
7. This phenomenon was, and arguably still is, possible in the Kosovo conflict,
should the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or Albania move to protect
ethnic Albanian brethren in Kosovo, which in turn could spur the involvement of
NATO allies Greece and Turkey.  See Steven Woehrel & Julie Kim, Kosovo and U.S.
Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, Order Code IB98041, Sept. 4,
1998, at 11; A Survey of the Balkans: Europe’s Roughest Neighborhood, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24,
1998, at 3 (noting Western concerns of a “slow dance to disaster” in which conflict
would spread to neighboring countries) [hereinafter Europe’s Roughest Neighborhood].
8. See G.A. Res. 558, supra note 4, at Agenda Item 112(c), ¶ 7.
9. In addition, a national government may be unable to help its displaced
citizens due to a lack of resources.  See Lewis, supra note 4, at 694 (asserting the lack
of national protection of the internally displaced as the key issue that the
international community must address).  This group of persons unprotected by their
government usually does not include those who are displaced due to environmental
or man-made disasters.  See id.
10. “Refugees,” as defined by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
are persons living outside their country of nationality due to a “well-founded fear” of
persecution based on “race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular
social group or political opinion” and who are unwilling to avail themselves to the
protection of their nation or return to that country because of such fear.  See
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152.
11. See S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2943rd mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/670
(1990) (condemning Iraq’s efforts at forcing Kuwaiti nationals to leave Kuwait); S.C.
Res. 767, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3101st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/767 (1992)
(expressing alarm that human suffering and rapid deterioration of internal stability
within Somalia constitute a threat to international peace and security); S.C. Res. 812,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3183rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/812 (1993) (expressing alarm
at increasing number of refugees and displaced persons in Rwanda).
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of some countries to accept refugees combined with the increasingly
strict entry requirements have served as catalysts for the study and
development of effective methods to prevent displacement.13  Until
such prevention occurs, displaced persons, who are not granted the
hospitality of a border country, are forced to remain internally
displaced within their home country.
Internally displaced persons are not included in the body of laws
that protect refugees.14  International laws that allegedly prohibit
internal displacement have never been enforced.15  Recent examples
of internal displacement16 prove that these laws lack effective
                                                 
12. Previously, countries were motivated to accept refugees, particularly those
opposed to their home-country’s national government, in order to gain political
advantage with the United States or the Soviet Union.  See COHEN & DENG, supra note
2, at 4.  But along with diminished economic opportunities and “tensions between
the haves and the have-nots,” public opinion gradually favored increased restrictions
on immigration and increased efforts to stem illegal immigration.  See JAMES LEE RAY,
GLOBAL POLITICS 72 (6th ed. 1995) (noting U.S. public opinion regarding, and
Western European efforts at restricting, immigration in the early 1990s) (citations
omitted).
13. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 3 (describing the impetus to clarify and
create guidelines for assisting internally displaced persons).
14. In addition to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, refugees’
rights are protected expressly in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.  See
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; see also
Declaration of Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968); U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (defining refugees as persons who are
“unable or unwilling to return to [their countries’ of origin] . . . because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”); see also
Arthur C. Helton, The Legal Dimensions of Preventing Forced Migration, 90 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 545, 546 (1996) (arguing for increasing responsibility of the
international community for preventing population displacement through
reformation of legal standards and institutions).  Some have criticized the separate
treatment of refugees and the internally displaced, noting that often both flee their
homes because of human rights violations, yet the level of legal protection they
receive is determined by whether the person chooses to flee to a different country.
See Luke T. Lee, Legal Status of Internally Displaced Persons, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
630, 631 (1992) (arguing that the international community still “ascrib[es] certain
magical qualities to the crossing of national boundaries as the determinant of how
we treat our fellow human beings in trouble”).
15. The international laws that allegedly prohibit internal displacement will be
discussed later in this Comment.  See infra Part III.B.  Recently, these laws were
compiled and clarified in a cohesive document.  See Francis M. Deng, Guiding
Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, reprinted in COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at
app.  Some scholars argue that there is a need for an express prohibition on
population transfers.  See Christa Meindersma, Legal Issues Surrounding Population
Transfers in Conflict Situations, 41 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 31, 82 (1994) (advocating the
development of an international legal instrument rendering population transfers per
se illegal); Maria Stavropoulou, The Question of a Right Not to be Displaced, 90 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 549, 553 (1996) (observing that an explicit guarantee would clarify
existing international law and contribute to an increased awareness of the human
rights concerns implicated in population transfers).
16. See U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1998, at 2 (citing
Uganda, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, and Congo-Zaire as countries in which
248 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:243
implementation.17
One example of displacement occurred within the former
Yugoslavia during 1998.  Attempting to quell an armed insurgence in
the province of Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”),
led by President Slobodan Milosevic, used Ministry and special police
forces to attack Kosovar villages in which suspected rebels resided.18
Fearing government attack, tens of thousands of Kosovars fled their
homes and were forced to live outdoors without shelter and away
from their villages.19
Prior legal commentary has focused on the legal status,
humanitarian needs, and protection of human rights of persons after
they have been displaced.20  This Comment does not address the legal
protection of the needs of persons already displaced,21 nor does it
discuss State responsibility for internal displacement.22  Instead, this
Comment considers whether deterrence of individual criminal
violations of international law can prevent internal displacement.  In
                                                 
significant internal displacement occurred in 1997); Elizabeth E. Ruddick, Note, The
Continuing Constraint of Sovereignty:  International Law, International Protection, and the
Internally Displaced, 77 B.U. L. REV. 429, 433 (1997) (citing Kurds fleeing oppression
in Iraq, Cambodians expelled from Thailand, and Croatia’s refusal to accept Bosnian
refugees as recent examples of internally displaced groups).
17. See Ruddick, supra note 16, at 440 (asserting that “the problem then, is not a
lack of rights, but a lack of compliance and implementation”).
18. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Talks Continue as Serbs Prepare for NATO Airstrikes:  The
Kosovo Crisis, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1998, at A39 (providing synoptic, historical
background of armed conflict in Kosovo).
19. See id. (describing current status of internally displaced ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo); Woehrel & Kim, supra note 7, at 5 (recounting the Serbian offensive of late
Spring 1998 that resulted in the flight of over 250,000 people from their homes to
other parts of Kosovo, and of over 40,000 people who fled to Albania and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
20. See, e.g., Christopher M. Goebel, A Unified Concept of Population Transfer, 21
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 29, 43-53 (1992) (reviewing effects of population transfers
on those being moved and how these effects may rise to the level of violations of
international human rights); Lewis, supra note 4, at 718-20 (discussing effects of
internal displacement); Ruddick, supra note 16, at 439-49 (proposing that
international laws may protect internally displaced persons during displacement).
21. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 92-122 (discussing the risks of
discrimination, violence, and detention; needs of subsistence, documentation,
education; and access to assistance).  For a thorough and contemporary assessment
of what protections are available in international law to displaced persons, and the
provision of humanitarian assistance to those persons, see id.
22. Assigning a state responsibility for displacement can be accomplished
through the passage of a United Nations General Assembly resolution or a resolution
of another U.N. body.  See Lewis, supra note 4, at 705-06 (noting difficulty in
enforcing states’ obligations to respect human rights).  Compelling a state to remedy
this internal problem, however, is a considerable challenge for the international
community.  See Nancy D. Arnison, International Law and Non-Intervention:  When Do
Humanitarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199, 199
(1993) (discussing state sovereignty as a “formidable obstacle” to meeting
humanitarian needs of nationals).
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other words, would holding leaders such as President Slobodan
Milosevic criminally liable for underhanded attempts to remove
citizens of a particular ethnic group prevent internal displacement in
the future.
Part I of this Comment recounts the events leading up to the 1998
internal displacement crisis in Kosovo and the United Nations’
response to that crisis.  This case study does not include events in
Yugoslavia beyond the first brokered cease fire between the Kosovo
Liberation Army (“KLA”) and Yugoslav forces in the Fall of 1998.
Such events not included are the involvement of NATO military
forces and the Serbs’ commission of atrocities in March, 1999.23  Part
II explains the international laws applicable to internal displacement
and how the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (“Tribunal”) has an unprecedented opportunity to
reinforce and to promote international humanitarian law and human
rights by holding individuals criminally responsible for internal
displacement.  Part III analyzes the laws regarding internal
displacement and whether the Tribunal could utilize them, while
acknowledging that certain problems exist that hinder such
utilization.  This Comment concludes that existing international laws
prohibiting internal displacement cannot be used successfully by the
Tribunal to hold individuals criminally liable.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Kosovo Before and During the Yugoslav War, 1992-199524
Kosovo is a province of Serbia25 and has a population consisting of
over ninety percent ethnic-Albanians.26  Prior to the break up of the
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, Kosovo was an autonomous
                                                 
23. Acts committed in March, 1999 by Yugoslav forces against ethnic Albanians
may fall within the gambit of crimes against humanity or genocide.  This Comment
serves to assess the status of a less clear-cut situation:  people who flee their homes in
fear of violence and as the indirect victims of governmental action.
24. See Europe’s Roughest Neighbourhood, supra note 7, at 5 (detailing a chronology
of important dates in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia).
25. Serbia and Montenegro make up the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  See id.
at 3 (detailing the emergence of newly independent countries and republics within
the territory of the former Yugoslavia).
26. Populated by descendants of an ancient Illyrian tribe, Kosovo was conquered
by the Romans in 167 B.C.  See Smith, supra note 18, at A39 (explaining the ethnic
ancestry of parties to Kosovo conflict).  Seven hundred years later in the sixth
century, the population was pushed south into what is now Albania, only to return in
the fourteenth century, after the expansion of the Ottoman Empire.  See id.  Today’s
Kosovars speak Albanian, and many practice the religion of Islam.  See id.
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province of that country.27  Josip Broz Tito, President of the former
Yugoslavia and leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from the
end of World War II until his death in 1980, maintained the Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia as a federal system of six republics.28  Tito and
the Communist leadership drew republic boundaries in order to limit
the Serbian population in each republic and to decrease any
attending risk of Serb nationalism.29  Through Communist control of
the military and monopoly of power, Tito maintained a
decentralized, but controlled, federal system of government.30  The
1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia described the country as “a federal
republic of free and equal nations and nationalities,” with Kosovo
being the latter, a “nationality” within the “nation” of Serbia.31
Tito’s death, in May of 1980, loosened the glue of repression that
he and the Communist Party formerly provided.32  Contributing to a
rising tide of nationalism among previously disenfranchised Serbs,
Serbian political leader Slobodan Milosevic alleged that ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo, and their ancestors, had committed
“genocide”33 with respect to the Serbian population in Kosovo.34
                                                 
27. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE:  THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 23-24 (1997) (providing a
condensed review of the historical demarcation of Yugoslavia’s national boundaries).
28. See id. (“After the war, Tito established a federal system in Yugoslavia
consisting of six republics—Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and
Montenegro—and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) within the
Republic of Serbia.”).
29. See id. at 24 (“The reordered internal boundaries were aimed at containing
Serbian nationalism by stranding Serb minorities in each of the republics outside
Serbia itself.”).
30. See ANTE CUVALO, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 232-33
(1997) (providing a capsule description of Josip Broz Tito and his place in the
history of the former Yugoslavia).
31. A “nation” in Communist doctrine was an entity with potential to form a
nation-state, while a “nationality” represented a “displaced bit of a nation” that was
not included in the federation.  See NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO:  A SHORT HISTORY 314-
33 (1998) (describing Kosovo under Tito’s rule of 1945 to 1980).  For Kosovo, its
excluded nation was considered to be Albania.  See id.
32. See SCHARF, supra note 27, at 24 (noting that Tito’s death and collapse of the
Soviet Union allowed “long-festering centrifugal forces” of ethnic-based conflict to
break free and cause the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia).
33. Genocide is “the intentional attempt to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group” through murder, causing serious bodily or mental harm,
deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction,
preventing births within the group, or through forcibly transferring the children of
the group to another group.  See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, art. II, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, art. IX, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 (1951),
cited in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 319
(1992) (explaining that methods used must be deliberately directed at a particular
group in order for such methods to be considered genocidal).
34. Intellectuals of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences presented a
Memorandum to the Yugoslav Assembly citing discrimination against Serbs
throughout the former Yugoslavia and  “physical, political, legal and cultural
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From the mid to late-1980s, respected Serbian academics and
historians contributed to a cultural war by publishing works
describing the entire history of the Serbian population in Kosovo as
“an unending chronicle of ethnic martyrdom.”35  Milosevic
transformed the Serbs into “victims” of ethnic Albanians.36
In March of 1989, Slobodan Milosevic became chief of the Socialist
Party of Serbia and President of the Republic of Serbia.37  With the
acquiescence of other government officials, he abrogated Kosovo’s
autonomy by secretly adopting a series of constitutional amendments
that abolished Kosovo’s separate representation in the Yugoslav
government.38  Thereafter, Milosevic expelled over 800,000 ethnic
Albanians from their jobs in Kosovo and replaced them with ethnic
Serbs.39  Significant governmental decisionmaking was moved from
Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, to Belgrade, the capital of Serbia.40
Through a series of independent elections held in reaction to losing
their voice in government, Kosovo-Albanians established a parallel
government consisting of a parliament and president,41 a system of
                                                 
genocide against the Serb population in Kosovo.”  See SCHARF, supra note 27, at 25; see
also MALCOLM, supra note 31, at 340 (offering a more detailed description of the role
of Serbian intellectuals in inciting Serb nationalism).
35. See MALCOLM, supra note 31, at 334-56.  From this point of view, the defeat of
valiant Prince Lazar and his Serbian forces by Ottoman Turks on June 28, 1389
began “an epoch of oppression” that ended only when Yugoslavia fell apart in the
Yugoslav War.  See Europe’s Roughest Neighbourhood, supra note 5, at 3 (providing
historical context for the current Balkan conflict).  Slobodan Milosevic capitalized on
the myth associated with the Battle of Kosovo, using the “great defeat” to remind
Serbs of their oppression and need to defend “their motherland, Kosovo.”  See JULIE
A. MERTUS, KOSOVO:  HOW MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR 184-85 (1999) (noting
that Serbian folklore portrays the battle as a great defeat of the Serbian Christian
army by the Turkish Muslim army, even though the Turkish conquest did not occur
until 70 years after Prince Lazar’s final battle).
36. For example, Serbian media and publications misreported a high rate of rape
of Serb women in Kosovo by Albanian men, eventually creating the impression that
Albanian men raped frequently and indiscriminately.  See MALCOLM, supra note 31, at
339 (asserting that the only serious statistical study completed in 1990 showed that
71% of reported rape cases in the decade of the 1980s involved an assailant and
victim of the same nationality).
37. The Serbian parliament elected Slobodan Milosevic to the Presidency of the
Republic earlier in 1989.  See CUVALO, supra note 30, at 168-69.
38. See MALCOLM, supra note 31, at 333-34 (recounting steps taken by Serbian
assembly to officially reduce Kosovo’s autonomy).
39. See MALCOLM, supra note 31, at 346-47 (describing actions taken by the
Serbian assembly in July 1990 in response to protests by ethnic Albanians); A Survey of
the Balkans: Albanian Angst, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1998, at 15-17 (reviewing historical
events which contributed to ethnic-Albanians’ desire for independence for Kosovo)
[hereinafter Albanian Angst].
40. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, DEP’T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998, at 1474 (1999).
41. See MALCOLM, supra note 31, at 347 (describing steps taken by Albanian
delegates in response to Serbian abrogation of Kosovo autonomy).
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taxation, and an educational system.42
Little changed in the political status of Kosovo during the Yugoslav
War.43  Serbian nationalistic fervor contributed to a rapidly
deteriorating human rights situation for the Albanian majority.
According to one United Nations Report, Serbs committed serious
discrimination and human rights violations against ethnic
Albanians.44  The Dayton Peace Accords, which officially ended the
                                                 
42. These efforts were in part funded by money sent from Kosovo Albanians
living abroad in support of the Democratic League of Kosovo (“LDK”).  See Albanian
Angst, supra note 39, at 15.
43. The Balkan conflict began with the republics of Slovenia and Croatia
declaring independence from Yugoslavia in June and July of 1991, respectively.  See
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 18-22 (1995) (providing a historical review of Yugoslav War).  The first
fighting occurred when irregular Serb forces, aided by the Yugoslav federal army,
attempted to halt the secession of Croatia.  See id.  In October, 1991, Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s parliament declared its sovereignty and passed a referendum for
independence in February, 1992.  See EDGAR O’BALLANCE, CIVIL WAR IN BOSNIA:  1992-
1994, at 21-22 (1995) (explaining that Croatia’s declaration of independence
triggered war with the “occupying” Yugoslav army).  Indigenous Serbs in the region
opposed the referendum and launched attacks aimed at taking control over Bosnian
territory.  Fierce fighting continued between Bosnians, many of them Muslim, and
Bosnian Serbs, who were furnished with arms and military supplies from Serbia.  See
id. at 28.
The United States recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on April
7, 1992.  See id.  The republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves to be
the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” later that month.  See id. at 34.  This resulted in
the creation of five separate entities out of the original Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia:  Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (“FRY”), which consists of Serbia and Montenegro.  See id. at 1-38
(explaining process of break-up of the former Yugoslavia into sovereign states).  On
November 21, 1995, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia assented to the Dayton Peace Agreement.  See Survey:  The
Balkans: A Precarious Peace, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1998, at 6 (assessing how the Dayton
Peace Agreement would be implemented).  The signatories of each republic,
including FRY President Slobodan Milosevic, agreed to “cooperate in the
investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international
humanitarian law.”  See Dayton Peace Accords, General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, art. IX, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75, 90 (1996).  The
Dayton Peace Agreement included a provision to guaranty the right of expelled
nationals to return voluntarily and to receive compensation for their transfer.  See
Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons,
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75, 137 (1996) (providing criteria for return of refugees and
displaced persons); see also George E. Little, Forced Movement of Peoples, 90 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC.  545, 545 (1996) (introductory remarks by Jean-Marie Henckaerts)
(noting inclusion of provisions in Dayton Peace Accords and creation of Commission
for Displaced Persons and Refugees to supervise implementation of these
provisions).
44. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50
(1993); MIRANDA VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB AND ALBANIAN:  A HISTORY OF KOSOVO 273-78
(1998) (discussing deteriorated socio-economic conditions and violations of human
rights, such as arbitrary arrest).
Slobodan Milosevic has yet to be brought to justice for crimes committed by
individuals under his command during the Yugoslav war.  See generally Paul Williams
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Yugoslav War, included only one provision regarding Kosovo:
economic sanctions against the FRY would continue as long as
human rights abuses were prevalent.45
B. After the Yugoslav War, Kosovo-Albanians and the Yugoslav
Government Resorted to Armed Conflict, Causing the Internal
Displacement of Thousands of People
In an expression of increasing frustration and impatience with the
continuing Serbian oppression, several shootings of Serb policemen
took place during the summer of 1996,46 for which the previously
unknown KLA took responsibility.47  Over a period of months, the
KLA mounted regular assaults on police stations in Kosovo, gathering
automatic weapons, and claimed responsibility for the assassinations
of more than fifty Serbian officials, police officers, and suspected
ethnic-Albanian collaborators.48  On February 28, 1998, Serbian
special police forces launched a large-scale, military attack on villages
in Kosovo, as they suspected KLA members to be harbored therein.49
In response, Kosovars attacked Serbian police.50  Government attacks
on Kosovar villages continued throughout the summer of 1998 in a
reported effort to crush the KLA insurgency, forcing ethnic
Albanians to flee their homes en masse.51
                                                 
& Norman Cigar, War Crimes and Individual Responsibility:  A Prima Facie Case for the
Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(proposing and detailing contents of an indictment of Yugoslav President Milosevic
for war crimes committed during the Yugoslav war).
45. See Vickers, supra note 44, at 287 (hypothesizing that as long as a relative
peace prevailed in Kosovo, there would be no international involvement as to the
province’s political status).
46. These terrorist-type acts included several shootings of Serb policemen, a
bomb blast in Podujevo, and an attack on the Serb Rector of PriÓtina University.  See
MALCOLM, supra note 31, at 355 (describing violence as expression of ethnic
Albanians’ increasing frustration with the repressive, Serbian-led government).
47. See id.; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, Kosovo’s Warriors Not Ready for Peace, WASH.
POST, Oct. 30, 1998, at A29.  Beginning in 1992, the predecessor to the KLA fought
for independence from Yugoslavia and closer ties with Albania.  See Chris Hedges, In
New Balkan Tinderbox, Ethnic Albanians Rebel Against Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at
A1 (speaking with KLA leadership).  Some of its members fought alongside Muslim-
led forces during the Bosnia war.  See id.
48. See Hedges, supra note 47, at A1 (describing events leading up to the Serbian
offensive against the KLA).
49. Some cities had no local police force because police officers reported directly
to Milosevic’s ruling party in Belgrade.  See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Serbian City Plods in
Totalitarian Rut Misery:  Fear Sap Reformist Zeal, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1998, at A33
(describing increasing centralization of local governance to Belgrade).
50. See Smith, supra note 18, at A39.
51. See Mike O’Connor, Kosovo Assault Steps Up, Making Thousands More Homeless,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1998, at A3 (reporting 20,000 to 30,000 ethnic Albanians fleeing
Yugoslav Government forces).  Examples of government attacks on villages are
detailed in an October 1998 report completed by the nongovernmental organization
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In the fall of 1998, both sides agreed to a cease fire after
participating in intense negotiations led by the United States.52  In
September, Belgrade announced that its special police forces would
pull out of the province and end what they had euphemized as “anti-
terrorism activities,” although their withdrawal did not begin
significantly until after the threat of NATO airstrikes.53  KLA rebels
quickly filled the resulting void.54  In the months after the cease-fire,
both the KLA and Yugoslav government engaged in a series of violent
clashes55 and full-scale war seemed imminent.56  War commenced
                                                 
Human Rights Watch.  See Human Rights Watch, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo (visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://www.hrw.org/
reports98/kosovo/Kos9810-07.htm>.  One such attack occurred in the Drenica
region of Kosovo in September, 1998.  See Holly Cartner, Eighteen Civilians Massacred
in Kosovo Forest:  Thirteen Others Believed Executed, Human Rights Watch Press Release
(last modified Sept. 29, 1998) <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press98/sept/
kosov929.htm>.  Approximately 18 ethnic Albanians were killed by Serbian police
units.  See id.  The victims, all of whom wore civilian clothing, included children (the
youngest being 18 months old), women, and elderly people (one being 95 years of
age).  See id.  The victims were part of an extended family that had sought refuge in
the forest after their village had been shelled.  See id.  This massacre allegedly
followed a pattern in which Serbian forces singled out the largest family in a village
for destruction, suspecting the male members to be involved in the KLA.  See Guy
Dinmore, New Kosovo Massacre May Spur NATO to Act, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1998, at
A21 (hypothesizing why government forces targeted the Delija family).
52. See Jane Perlez, Milosevic Accepts Kosovo Monitors, Averting Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1998, at A1 (detailing accord reached between U.S. special envoy Richard C.
Holbrooke and President Slobodan Milosevic).
53. Along with withdrawal of police forces, President Slobodan Milosevic also
agreed to allow the deployment of 2,000 unarmed observers under the auspices of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor the withdrawal
and cease-fire.  See William Drozdiak, Accord Puts NATO in Unchartered Territory:  New
Plunge Into Balkan Peacekeeping Is Major Expansion of European Security Role, WASH. POST,
Oct. 14, 1998, at A23 (describing the threats to bomb Yugoslavia as the first time the
NATO threatened the territory of sovereign).
54. See Guy Dinmore, Resumption of Fighting Seen Likely in Kosovo:  U.S. Official
Arrives to Lead, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1998, at A23 (noting KLA fighters returned to
previously-held strongholds after Yugoslav government forces withdrew).
55. See Reuters News Service, Opposing Kosovo Forces Tell Each Other to Quit, WASH.
POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at A35 (reporting three days of fighting in Lapastica in the
north of Kosovo province); Mike O’Connor, Rebels Attack Serb Police Post in Kosovo,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, at A16 (reporting ethnic Albanians attacked large police
post, wounding three officers and destroying armored personnel carriers); Misha
Savic, Kosovo Forces Suspend Fighting to Remove Wounded, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1998, at
A17 (explaining temporary truce reached after four days of fighting between Serbian
forces and “ethnic Albanian separatists” in Obranca); Police Crack Down After Killing in
Kosovo, Dec. 22, 1998, WASH. POST, at A34 (stating Serbian police conducted sweep of
Kosovar Albanian stronghold in retaliation for killing of Serbian police officer).
56. During the tenuous cease-fire that began in October 1998, the KLA grew in
strength and sophistication with the infusion of more volunteers and arms
shipments.  See Peter Finn, War Clouds Kosovo Adversaries’ View of Future:  Shattered
Cease-Fire Signals New Year of Conflict for Ethnic Albanians and Serbs, WASH. POST, Jan. 1,
1998, at A27 (describing local preparations by KLA for renewed fighting with
government forces).  By January 1999, 70% of KLA soldiers had prior military
experience.  See id.
1999] A KOSOVO CASE STUDY 255
when NATO bombs fell on Serbia on March 24, 1999.57
Although reported figures varied, between 770 and 2,000 civilians
were killed in 1998, more than one hundred villages or towns
containing 200,000 homes were destroyed, and more than 230,000 to
300,000 people were displaced.58  By November, 1998, one in every six
Kosovar inhabitants had been uprooted.59  Although the majority of
displaced persons were ethnic-Albanians, Serbian civilians living in
the province also were uprooted, as some fled for fear of being killed
by ethnic Albanians, and others fled simply to avoid being in the line
of fire.60  Some displaced persons did not return for fear of violence
at the hands of government forces.61
C. United Nations’ Response to Internal Displacement and Armed Conflict
in Kosovo
The flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and other European countries and the increase in internally
displaced persons from “the use of force” caused the United Nations
Security Council, under its Chapter VII authority,62 to recognize the
                                                 
57. See Charles Babington, Clinton Goal is to Contain Milosevic:  No Time Limit Set on
NATO Airstrikes, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1999, at A1 (reporting on President Clinton’s
announcement that a NATO military offensive would be the consequence of
Yugoslav refusal to sign the Rambouillet peace agreement that included autonomy
for Kosovo and 28,000 NATO peacekeepers).
58. See Report of the Secretary General Prepared Pursuant to Resolution 1160, ¶ 7, U.N.
Doc. S/1998/834 (1998) (estimating 230,000 displaced and “numerous civilian
casualties”); Adrian Dasclau, Monitors Restore Cease-Fire in Kosovo, WASH. POST, Dec. 29,
1998, at A11 (citing 2,000 deaths and 250,000 refugees); R. Jeffrey Smith, Kosovo Plan
Spells Out Local Powers:  U.S. Proposal Outlines Power-Sharing, WASH. POST, Nov. 10,
1998, at A31 (reporting 800 deaths and 300,000 refugees); R. Jeffrey Smith, Holbrook,
Milosevic Meet About Kosovo, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1998, at A35 (citing killing of 35
members of Kosovo Liberation Army and of six Serbian teenagers) [hereinafter
Smith, Holbrook]; Ismet Hajdari, Milosevic Ally Makes Kosovo Vow, A.P. ONLINE, Dec. 31,
1998, available in 1998 WL 25274919 (reporting approximately 1,000 people killed
and tens of thousands uprooted).  The variations in the numbers of displaced person
could be attributed to the difficulty in gathering precise population statistics and the
collection of data on different dates.  See O’Connor, supra note 55 (implying same).
59. See Smith, supra note 47, at A29.  For a field report evaluating the impact of
internal displacement on women and children in Kosovo, see JULIE MERTUS,
WOMEN’S COMM’N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN
KOSOVO:  THE IMPACT ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1998) (on file with author)
(assessing “emergency” of displacement and making recommendations for
international humanitarian groups).
60. See O’Connor, supra note 55, at A16 (“As part of what appears to be a strategy
of frightening [Serbian civilians] into leaving the area, rebels have abducted several
Serbs from remote villages.  The victims are though to have been killed.”).
61. The town of Malisevo, once a KLA stronghold in south-central Kosovo,
remained a “ghost town” while its displaced residents feared returning due to the
continued presence of Yugoslav police in the area.  See Smith, Holbrook, supra note 58,
at A35.
62. Chapter VII, Article 39 of the United Nations Charter reads:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
256 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:243
conflict in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security.63
Security Council Resolution 1160 recognized the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction over any war crimes or crimes against humanity that
possibly could have occurred during the conflict in Kosovo,64 and
urged the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal to
begin gathering information regarding the occurrence of possible
                                                 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39, para. 1.  Under the UN Charter, Member States are bound to
abide by Security Council decisions.  See  id. art. 25, para. 1 (“The Members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter.”).
The establishment of the Tribunal as a valid exercise of Security Council powers
has been affirmed by the Tribunal as well as many legal scholars. See, e.g.,  Prosecutor
v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 32-48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., App.
Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 44-48 (1996) (holding that the
establishment of the Tribunal falls within the powers of the Security Council and was
established according to necessary procedures under the U.N. Charter); Payam
Akhavan, Punishing War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: A Critical Juncture for the New
World Order, 15 HUMAN RTS. Q. 262, 268-72 (1993) (citing Security Council authority
to adopt measures not involving the use of armed force in order to restore
international peace and security); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating
Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Establishing an International Criminal
Tribunal, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1191, 1202 (1995) (reviewing steps taken by the
United Nations in establishing the Tribunal); James C. O’Brien, The International
Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM.
J. INT’L L. 639, 642-44 (1993) (asserting Security Council’s approach to establishing
the Tribunal as methodical and therefore appropriate).
63. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg., ¶¶ 1-4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1199 (1998) (demanding a cessation of hostilities, immediate entrance into
peace negotiations, and immediate taking of steps to relieve humanitarian crisis).
The internal conflict could have widened to include the neighboring province of
Macedonia, if the province’s population of ethnic Albanians joined the resistance
against the Serb-led Yugoslav government.  See Hedges, supra note 47, at A1
(referring to the risk of the conflict widening geographically).  In addition, the
Albanian government warned that it would “act as one nation” if “outright war”
erupted between ethnic Albanians and Serbs.  See id.
64. The temporal and territorial jurisdiction was established by the Security
Council, at the recommendation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and
is expressed in Article 1 of the Tribunal’s statute: “The International Tribunal shall
have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.”  Statute of the
International Tribunal, art. 1, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27, at app. B
[hereinafter Tribunal Statute]; see also S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th
mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES 827 (1993) (approving report of Secretary-General
and establishing parameters of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction).  The “life span” of the
Tribunal is tied to “the restoration and maintenance of international peace and
security” as determined by the Security Council.  See S.C. Res. 827, supra, at Annex;
Tribunal Statute, supra, at arts. 41 & 42, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27, at app. B.
Only the date upon which the Tribunal’s jurisdiction began was defined because at
the time of its formation, the Yugoslav conflict had yet to end.  See MORRIS & SCHARF,
supra note 43, at 119 (describing jurisdictional aspects of the Tribunal).
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crimes.65  As of September, 1999, no indictments were filed for
human rights violations in Kosovo because Yugoslav authorities have
limited the Prosecutor’s ability to investigate alleged crimes in the
province thoroughly,66 despite Security Council demands.67  But even
if investigations are allowed and prosecutions do follow, the problem
of prevention still remains:  how can leaders be held individually
criminally liable for internal displacement under the current body of
international law when that law does not specifically prescribe
internal displacement as an international crime?68  The next section
examines what existing law may serve to protect people from internal
displacement if such law is enforced.
                                                 
65. See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3836th mtg., ¶ 17, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1160 (1998).  The Prosecutor is one of the three “organs” which compose
the Tribunal.  See Tribunal Statute, supra note 64, at art. 11, reprinted in SCHARF, supra
note 27, at app. B.  The Prosecutor is responsible for investigating and prosecuting
persons “responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.”  See id. art.
16, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27, at app. B.  The Prosecutor is nominated by the
Secretary-General of the U.N. and appointed by the Security Council, and serves a
term of four years.  See id., reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27, at app. B.  According
the Tribunal’s Rules and Procedure, the Prosecutor initiates investigations ex-officio
or after receiving information which the Prosecutor decides to be sufficient to
warrant further investigation.  See id. art. 18, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27, at app.
B.  Investigative powers include questioning suspects, victims, and possible witnesses;
on-site investigations; and the collection of evidence.  See id., reprinted in SCHARF,
supra note 27, at app. B.  Once the Prosecutor has determined a prima facie case
exists, the Prosecutor prepares an indictment, which is presented to a Trial Chamber
judge for confirmation or dismissal, and the issuance of a subsequent arrest warrant,
if applicable.  See id., reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27, at app. B.  The other two
organs of the Tribunal are the two Trial Chambers and one Appeals Chamber, and a
Registry that is responsible for all administrative tasks.  See id. art. 11., reprinted in
SCHARF, supra note 27, at app. B.
66. The Yugoslav government does not recognize the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and
has refused to grant visas to investigators from  the Tribunal in the Hague.  See
Dinmore, supra note 51, at A1 (reporting Chief Prosecutor for Tribunal was turned
away at FRY border because she was not granted a visa); Perlez, supra note 52, at A14
(stating recent effort to obtain testimonial evidence is a “test case” of how Tribunal
can exercise jurisdiction).  The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia pledged to cooperate
in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes when it initialed the Dayton Peace
Accords on November 21, 1995, on behalf of the Republic of Srpska.  See Dayton
Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, art. IX, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75, 90 (1996).
67. On November 17, 1998, the Security Council called on the Yugoslav
government to end its ban on Tribunal investigation in Kosovo.  See John M. Goshko,
U.N. Council Pushes Kosovo Probe:  14-0 Vote Backs Resolution Opposing Ban on Tribunal
Team, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1998, at A34 (reporting that despite Milosevic’s earlier
promises to cooperate with the Tribunal, he has refused to do so with regards to
Kosovo as he does not recognize the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over a “purely internal”
matter).
68. The principle nullem crimen sine lege bars the prosecution of an act that was
not a crime under international law at the time it was committed.  See infra note 152.
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II. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A.  Defining Population Transfers
The term “population transfer” has been subject to various
interpretations.69  Most broadly, and for purposes of this Comment,
the phrase “involuntary population transfers” includes two categories
of civilians:  (1) those who are forced to leave their homes, cross
national borders, and become refugees;70 and (2) those who are
displaced involuntarily from their homes, but remain in their own
country.
1. Persons who cross their nation’s borders:  Expulsion
In the first category, involuntary transfer commonly takes the form
of mass expulsion, which entails a government’s action, or failure to
act, with the intent to remove persons against their will from the
territory of that state.71  A traditional example is the mass deportation
of civilians.72  The “ethnic cleansing”73 of the Bosnia War, in which
areas were “cleansed” of ethnic minorities through the use of arrests
                                                 
69. See Meindersma, supra note 15, at 32-33 (asserting that varying definitions
exists and acknowledging a need to establish a coherent definition for purposes of
clarifying the rights of those transferred).  According to one author, the point of
population transfer occurs principally on the removal of people.  See Alfred M. de
Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 207, 209
(1969) (categorizing transfers according to the type of transfer: deportation,
expulsion, international agreements, and internal transfers).  Another definition
emphasizes the governmental rationale or motivation behind the transfer.  See
Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol
II].
70. For a definition of “refugee,” see supra note 10.
71. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 2 (1995).  A modern theory of mass expulsion includes governmental
action that has the effect of expelling large numbers of persons across national
frontiers, e.g., persecution, economic policies, voluntary return policies, and
population exchange.  See id. at 108-34 (proposing that various methods governments
employ result in indirect mass expulsion of civilian populations).  For examples of
population exchanges, see de Zayas, supra note 69, at 246-50, which discusses option
agreements and population exchange treaties.
72. This type of mass expulsion is in clear violation of the Nuremberg Charter
and constitutes crimes against humanity or war crimes.  See Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, art. 6(b) (defining war crimes to
include “deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
populations” before or during a war); see also Goebel, supra note 20, at 32-33
(discussing when population transfer is a crime against humanity).  For a brief
explanation of the Nuremberg Charter and Trials, see infra note 79.
73. “Ethnic cleansing” is the employment of methods, such as killing or
terrorizing, in order to destroy and disperse an entire ethnic group from a particular
territory.  See SCHARF, supra note 27, at 31 (noting the term was first coined during
World War II and applied to efforts used to “cleanse” a territory of its Serbian
population).
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and subsequent expulsion across state boundaries, is a recent
example of mass expulsion.74  One author argues the method used to
create population transfers across national borders is irrelevant:
“criminal liability attaches once such removal is effected no matter
which methods are used to achieve this goal.”75  Whether there is
criminal liability for population transfers that occur within a nation’s
borders is not as clear.76
2. Persons who remain within their nations’ borders:  Forced relocation vs.
internal displacement
Civilian transfers that occur solely within a nation’s boundaries
previously have been defined as either “forced relocation” or
“internal displacement.”77  Prior to the expansion of human rights in
international law, internal population transfers were deemed to fall
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state involved and
outside the purview of international law.78  With the recognition at
the Nuremberg Trials79 that some human rights transcend the
principle of state sovereignty over domestic matters, many newly
created international instruments stated that forced relocation within
a nation’s territory is contrary to international law.80  Forced
relocation usually involves a forcible resettlement of nationals
pursuant to a government policy, such as the United States’
relocation of Japanese-Americans to internment camps during World
War II.81  This phenomenon of forced relocation appears to require a
                                                 
74. See Alfred M. de Zayas, The Right to One’s Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 CRIM. L.F. 257, 262 (1995)
(examining the use of mass expulsions to achieve ethnic cleansing) .
75. See Michael P. Roch, Forced Displacement in the Former Yugoslavia:  A Crime Under
International Law?, 14 DICK. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (1995) (providing a preliminary look at
the laws surrounding forced displacement in armed conflicts).  For one author’s list
of treaty provisions and declarations affecting mass expulsions, see HENCKAERTS,
supra note 71, at app. II.
76. See infra Parts II.B-III.E.
77. See HENCKAERTS, supra note 71, at 2 (presenting terminology of internal
civilian transfers).
78. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (Rudolf Bernhardt et
al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA] (providing a historical survey of “forced
resettlement” and statement of its current legal status).
79. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was created in the wake of
World War II and was used to try and convict Nazi military commanders who were
responsible for the commission of atrocities during the war.  See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 880-84 (3d ed. 1993) (reviewing the
Nuremberg Charter and Trials as efforts to discourage or prevent war).
80. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 78, at 423 (describing evolution of legal
prohibition against forced relocation by a national government).
81. See id. (noting that prior to international human rights law, most instances of
forced relocation were governed by municipal law, and international legal issues
would arise only if the persons affected were aliens and their state of origin
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government taking a direct action for the purposes of relocating
large numbers of citizens.
Forced relocation or purposeful expulsion of a group is a type of
ethnic cleansing,82 although it has not been prosecuted as such to
date.83  Defined as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or
religious group to remove by violent or terror-inspiring means the
civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain
geographic areas,”84 ethnic cleansing was executed methodologically
in the Bosnia War.85  Although ethnic cleansing itself is not
recognized as a crime under international law, this conduct often
entails rape, mass killings, imprisonment, and shelling of cities, all of
which constitute crimes against humanity or grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions.86  The Yugoslav government did not appear to
                                                 
attempted to exercise diplomatic protection on their behalf).
82. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 24 (asserting that communities do not
flee but rather government-sponsored ethnic cleansing campaigns force people from
their homes).  According to one author, ethnic cleansing contains particular
characteristics.  See  Drazen Petrovic, Ethnic Cleansing:  An Attempt at Methodology, 5
EUR. J. INT’L L. 342, 352 (1994) (attempting to dissect “ethnic cleansing” into
elements).  Ethnic cleansing consists of systematic, actual, or implied official
sanction, and is perpetrated against a particular group defined by ethnic, national,
religious, or other categories.  See id.  Actions that compose ethnic cleansing take
different forms, ranging from economic discrimination to extermination of the
group.  See id.  The form used depends upon what methods are available.  See id.
Those who advocate this policy “by definition cannot respect international
humanitarian law.”  Id.
83. Acts that compose “ethnic cleansing” have been prosecuted as violations of
laws and customs of war, crimes against humanity, grave breaches, or genocide.  See
id. at 358-59.
84. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Annex, para. 265, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674 (1994) (confirming the Commission’s earlier definition of ethnic
cleansing).
85. First, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, assisted by the Yugoslav Army under
the control of Slobodan Milosevic, would seize control of an area and give Serb
residents the opportunity to leave.  See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE
LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 612
(1996) (describing the Serbian nationalist policy of ethnic cleansing).  Homes of
non-Serbs and cultural and religious monuments were targeted for destruction.  See
id.  Next, paramilitary forces would terrorize the non-Serb residents of the seized
area by randomly looting their homes, raping and killing them.  See id.  The
government frequently and purposefully publicized the violence in order to
encourage civilian flight.  See id.  The paramilitary forces required many non-Serb
residents to sign documents relinquishing their property rights to municipal
authorities.  See id. at 613.
86. See id. at 48 (asserting that ethnic cleansing includes illegal acts such as killing
and torturing civilians and forcibly relocating civilian populations); see also Secretary-
General’s Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1173 (1993) [hereinafter Report on Establishing an
International Tribunal] (stating that acts such as willful killing, torture, or rape,
systematically committed against civilians constitute crimes against humanity and are
1999] A KOSOVO CASE STUDY 261
utilize forced relocation of ethnic Albanians during 1998.87  Although
there was no specific government program or transfer policy,
thousands of people were nevertheless expelled from their homes.88
These people fall within the category of internal displacement, the
second type of internal population transfer.
Internal displacement involves the uprooting of people because of
civil war, ethnic tensions, environmental disasters, or other
circumstances in which serious human rights violations occur.89  This
category does not require a purposeful, direct action by the
government, but instead appears to emphasize the effect of a
government’s acts or policies.  No internationally accepted definition
of “internally displaced persons” exists,90 and “no single legal
principle is applicable to all population transfers wherever or
whenever they occur.”91  This lack of clarity demonstrates the
uncertainty in this area of the law, and poses a significant challenge
to the international community to prevent such displacements in the
future.
3. United Nations’ attempt to define displacement
In recognition of this morass and the “international legal
vacuum”92 surrounding internal displacement, the United Nations
sought to address the problem of internal displacement through a
comprehensive approach.93  First, the Secretary-General, at the
                                                 
an example of “ethnic cleansing”).  According to the Commission of Experts, which
apprised the Security Council of occurrences on the ground during the Yugoslav
War, displacement and deportation of civilian populations are means of carrying out
ethnic cleansing.  See Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,
Feb. 9, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25274, quoted in de Zayas, supra note 74, at 294-95
(discussing process of ethnic cleansing as a means of forced relocation).  These acts
could also demonstrate the crime of genocide.  See de Zayas, supra note 74, at 294-95
(proposing ethnic cleansing could fall under the rubric of crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and genocide).
87. The author has not discovered any reports of government personnel
rounding up ethnic Albanian civilians in 1998 and forcibly transporting the civilians
away from their villages.
88. See text accompanying supra note 39 (describing how Milosevic expelled over
800,000 Albanians).
89. See HENCKAERTS, supra note 71, at 2 (distinguishing types of involuntary,
internal movement of people from mass expulsion).
90. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 695 (recognizing that no clear definition of
internal displacement exists, and therefore, categorizing internal displacement
according to its identified causes of “forced displacement,” persecution, and civil
war).
91. See Meindersma, supra note 15, at 35 (providing an overview of international
legal standards regarding population transfer in conflict situations).
92. Cohen & Deng, supra note 2, at 7.
93. The Commission on Human Rights hoped to create a framework for
protecting and assisting internally displaced persons through more-responsive
governments and a “systemic” international response.  See Analytical Report of the
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request of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, appointed a
representative to assess:  (1) the causes and consequences of internal
displacement; (2) the effect of international law on those persons
internally displaced; (3) the extent to which existing international
institutions, such as the World Health Organization and the United
Nations Development Programme, currently address the needs of
internally displaced populations; and (4) the ways in which
protection and assistance of the displaced could be improved.94
Francis Deng, the representative of the U.N. Secretary General,
developed a set of guiding principles to serve as a cumulative source
of various legal norms applicable to internal displacement and to
supplement significant gaps and unclear areas in the law.95  The
purpose of these guiding principles is to “serve as an international
standard to guide governments as well as international humanitarian
and development agencies in providing assistance and protection” to
internally displaced persons.96  These guiding principles create a
“normative framework” to demonstrate and reinforce already existing
legal protections.97  For example, the guiding principles establish that
every person has a right to be protected from displacement,98 and
authorities are to “ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in
order to avoid displacement altogether.”99  The guiding principles are
not legally binding, but with a pattern of state utilization, eventually
the principles could attain the status of international customary law.100
                                                 
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, supra note 2, at Agenda Item 9(d).
94. See id.
95. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 7-8 (describing the Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement as a first step in the development of a legally binding instrument
for protection of, and assistance to, the internally displaced).
96. See Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, supra
note 2, para. 2 (presenting guidelines for a nation-state to use when faced with the
risk or occurrence of population displacement).
97. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 75 (describing the purpose of preparing a
document of guiding principles).
98. “Every human being shall have the right to be protected against being
arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence.”  Deng,
supra note 15, at Principle 6(1), reprinted in COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at app.
99. Id. at Principle 7(1), reprinted in COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at app.  This
principle allows displacement if “no alternative exist[s],” but notes that “all measures
shall be taken to minimize displacement and its adverse effects.”  See id.
100. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 258 (discussing role of Guiding Principles
in the international community and the goal of preventing internal displacement
through eventual acceptance of the principles as legally binding).  International
custom, one source of international law, is “a general recognition among States of a
certain practice as obligatory.”  See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11 (4th ed. 1990).  The elements of an international custom
include:  a general practice among states, substantial uniformity in the practice of
states, and opinio uris or the belief by states that international law requires the
practice.  See id. at 5-8.  International and national judicial decisions, national
legislation, diplomatic correspondence, national institutional manuals (e.g., manuals
1999] A KOSOVO CASE STUDY 263
Although these guidelines are intended to steer state actions without
providing a source of criminal liability, the Tribunal may utilize the
law upon which these guidelines are founded to impose individual
accountability for internal displacement.
B. International Laws Regarding Internal Displacement
Unlike population transfers that occur during international armed
conflicts, current international law does not guarantee the protection
of civilians from internal displacement.101  Instead, international
humanitarian law potentially could be used in the prosecution of
persons responsible for displacement.102  This body of law can be
utilized only during armed conflict,103 and individuals may be held
criminally responsible for violations of these laws.
                                                 
of military law) and General Assembly resolutions are a few of the many material
sources that can be used to prove the existence of an international custom and,
therefore, an international customary law.  See id. at 5.  A state can escape the binding
authority of an international customary law only if it has “persistent objector” status.
See id. at 10.  A state is a persistent objector only if it has persistently objected to the
particular practice at issue since the birth of said practice in the international
community.  See id.  A presumption of a state’s acceptance of the customary law can
only be rebutted by clear evidence of that state’s persistent objection to the practice.
See id.
101. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 74 (citing the absence of an express right
not to be unlawfully displaced as a weakness of international law).  International
humanitarian law clearly prohibits forced transfers that occur during an
international armed conflict.  See Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 47-49, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.  Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: “Individual or mass
forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power of to that of any other country,
occupied or not, are prohibited regardless of their motive.”  Id. at art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at
3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318.
102. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 74 (recognizing the difficulties
organizations and institutions have when attempting to determine which guarantees
apply to the matter at hand).
103. Also called “humanitarian law of armed conflict,” this body of law began as a
merger of the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, 27 July 1929.  See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 147-65 (1992) (reviewing
historical legal foundation of international humanitarian law and regulation of
armed conflict).
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1. Common Article 3 of the 1949 Four Geneva Conventions104
The principal source of humanitarian law that governs non-
international, armed conflicts is common Article 3 to the four 1949
Geneva Conventions.105  Common Article 3 applies to armed conflicts
between a government’s armed forces and organized, armed
insurgents106 and binds all parties to the conflict.107  Even if a state has
not yet ratified the Geneva Conventions, it is still bound to the terms
of common Article 3 as this article is considered to be customary
international law.108  Common Article 3 does not address the question
of population transfers and does not specifically include forced
displacement as a crime.109  It does prohibit, in non-derogable
provisions,110 “outrages against personal dignity” and “cruel
treatment,” which arguably occur during and as a result of internal
displacement.111  Despite no express provision in common Article 3
regarding criminal liability, the Tribunal recognized that individual
criminal responsibility is not “barred” for violations of the article.112
                                                 
104. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative To The Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
105. See John R. Crook, Strengthening Legal Protection in Internal Conflicts, 3 I.L.S.A. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 491, 491 (1997) (characterizing common Article 3 as the “most
familiar” text applicable to internal armed conflicts).
106. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 81 (giving practical definition of non-
international, armed conflict).
107. See id. at 82 (explaining application of common Article 3 to parties to an
internal armed conflict as long as all parties meet specific criteria).
108. See Crook, supra note 105, at 491 (discussing the applicability of common
Article 3 to signatory and non-signatory states).
109. See Roch, supra note 75, at 16 (hypothesizing that forced displacement was
not included in common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention because the article was
the result of compromise).
110. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 80 (arguing Common Article 3 is non-
derogable as it is the only article of the four Geneva Conventions that applies to both
international and internal armed conflicts).
111. Victims can be caught in the cross-fire of armed conflict, lack educational
and health services, be subjected to sexual violence and harassment, live without
food, shelter or proper sanitation.  See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 5-7, 12.
112. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 128 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 70 (1996).  Then-
Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright stated on record that the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction over internal conflicts included violations of common Article
3 and Additional Protocol II.  See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 215th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3217, at 15 (1993) (statement of Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N.), quoted in Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
International Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 80 (1994) (referring to Ambassador Albright’s
affirmative statement as clarification of Tribunal’s jurisdiction, but not to status of
Additional Protocols as international customary law).
1999] A KOSOVO CASE STUDY 265
2. Applying common Article 3 to the conflict in Kosovo.
The International Committee of the Red Cross commentary to
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (“Official
Commentary”) provides guidelines to determine if a situation is an
internal armed conflict.113  According to the Official Commentary, an
internal armed conflict exists when parties possess organized military
forces, act within a determinate territory, and have the means by
which the parties can ensure respect for the Conventions.114  A
government’s use of regular military forces against an insurgency is
another indication of an internal armed conflict.115  Internal armed
conflicts are more difficult to define because although the incidents
of violence appear to be part of an orchestrated plan, they simply
could be isolated acts or acts committed neither under the guidance
of some central authority nor in a planned manner.116
The U.N. Security Council recognized the conflict in Kosovo as an
“armed conflict” within the meaning of international humanitarian
law.117  Because Kosovo is a province of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and all fighting occurred within its boundaries, the
conflict can be classified as internal for purposes of applying
common Article 3.  Further, the Security Council condemned the use
of force by the Yugoslav government and the KLA insurgency, and
called on both parties to seek a peaceful resolution.118  Clearly, this
recognition indicates that the international community viewed the
situation in Kosovo as more than isolated acts of violence, but rather
an armed conflict between two distinct parties capable of a cease-fire.
Although internal displacement arguably results in “outrages
against personal dignity,”119 a stronger argument would include
                                                 
113. See ICRC COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, paras. 4446-79 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds,
1987).
114. See id. paras. 4446-70.
115. See id. para. 4460.
116. See id. paras. 4471-76.
117. See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg., para. 5, U.N.  Doc.
S/RES/1199 (1998) (“Noting further the communication by the Prosecutor [of the
Tribunal] . . . expressing the view that the situation in Kosovo represents an armed
conflict within the terms of the mandate of the Tribunal . . . .”).
118. See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1160 (1998) (“Condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police
forces against civilians . . . as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation
Army.”).
119. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
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Additional Protocol II, which supplements common Article 3 and
contains express provisions regarding the involuntary displacement
of civilians.
3. Additional Protocol II 120
Additional Protocol II provides more specific protections from
forced movement or displacement.  The Official Commentary
describes Protocol II as a “mini-convention” and “the first real legal
instrument for the protection of victims of non-international armed
conflicts.”121  This agreement provides that the civilian population
should not be “the object of attack” and bars “acts or threats of
violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population.”122  Protocol II also explicitly prohibits anyone
from ordering or compelling civilians to be displaced.123  Article 17 of
Protocol II states:
(1)  The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered
for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians
involved or imperative military reasons so demand.  Should such
displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be
taken in order that the civilian population may be received under
satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety, and
nutrition.
(2)  Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for
reasons connected with the conflict.124
According to the Official Commentary on Protocol II, the first
provision includes the transfer of civilians by armed forces or groups
“because of military operations.”125  Article 17(1) allows for transfer to
occur under two circumstances:  when transfer is necessary in order
to safeguard the security of the civilian population or when
imperative military reasons exist.126  Imperative military reasons
                                                 
135; Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3(1), 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
120. See Protocol II, supra note 69.
121. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 113, para. 4337.
122. See Protocol II, supra note 69, at art. 13(2).
123. See Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, supra
note 2, para. 62, construed in Stavropoulou, supra note 15, 723 (reviewing
international humanitarian law regarding forced displacement).
124. Protocol II, supra note 69, at art. 17 (emphasis added).
125. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 113, para. 4861 (providing examples of
cases contemplated by the Conference).
126. See id. paras. 4853-54 (discussing two exceptional circumstances in which
forced displacement of civilians is permissible under Article 17).  Article 17 does not
include a right for displaced persons to return to their homes once the area is again
inhabitable, nor does it prohibit the appropriation or destruction of property during
displacement.  See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 85, at 623 (discussing deficiencies
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cannot entail political motives, and a “meticulous assessment of the
circumstances” is required.127  While Article 17(2) prohibits the
compulsion of civilians to leave “their own territory,” “territory” is not
clearly defined.128  The Official Commentary acknowledges the
possible translation of “territory” as “country,” but emphasizes a
broader interpretation—to be that of territory under the control of
an insurgent party.129
4. Applying additional Protocol II to the conflict in Kosovo
In reality, applying Article 17 of Protocol II to the conflict in
Kosovo is problematic.130  If government forces specifically were not
ordered to displace ethnic Albanians, or had made the necessary
attempts at differentiating civilians and members of the KLA engaged
in armed conflict, the Tribunal could find no violation of the
Protocol.131  More importantly, the drafters of Protocol II never
intended individual actors to be held criminally liable under it.132
Protocol II also may be an ineffective tool to prevent internal
displacement because state sovereignty is specifically preserved in
Article 3.133  Article 3 prohibits intervention in “legitimate” internal
efforts to “re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the
national unity and territorial integrity of the State.”134  The threat
                                                 
of Article 17 when prosecuting ethnic cleansing as a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions).
127. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 113, paras. 4853-54 (emphasizing that
moving a dissident group cannot be justified by a need to control the group).
128. See id. para. 4859 (discussing the meaning of “territory” within Article 17).
129. See id. (stating a broader interpretation is “better suited to all the possible
cases which might arise in a situation covered by Protocol II”).
130. See Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II:  History and Scope, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 29,
29 (1983) (explaining the limited nature of the application of Protocol II).
131. See Protocol II, supra note 69, at art. 17(1) (stating that the displacement of
civilians may not be ordered).  Additionally, Protocol II serves to protect the
“victims” of a non-international armed conflict, and not those individuals who are
currently taking part in the armed conflict.  See id. at Preamble (emphasizing “the
need to ensure a better protection for the victims of armed conflicts”); see also Junod,
supra note 130, at 29 (discussing to whom the protections of Protocol II apply and
why).
132. See Roch, supra note 75, at 17 (arguing that the omission of forced
displacement as a crime is indication of drafters’ intentions).
133. See Protocol II, supra note 69, at art. 3.  Article 3 reads:
Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the
sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all
legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to
defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.
(2) Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for
intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed
conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in
the territory of which that conflict occurs.
Id.
134. Id.
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presented by an independence-seeking armed uprising can be
considered a direct threat to “national unity and territorial
integrity.”135
A higher threshold than that required by common Article 3 must
be met before Protocol II can be applied:136  the conflict must occur
between national armed forces and “dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups” that exercise control over part of the
government forces’ territory, that have responsible command, and
that can “carry out sustained and concerted military operations.”137
Once these objective criteria are met, it reasonably can be expected
that the parties will apply the Protocol’s provisions because the
needed infrastructure is in place.138  In 1998, the KLA must have been
an armed group sufficiently organized to adhere to the Protocol
provisions.139  Such organization would require a command
structure.140  Regular incidents of random killings by the KLA after
the negotiated cease fire in October, 1998 could indicate a lack of
such effective command control, without which Protocol II cannot be
                                                 
135. See id.
136. Protocol II’s heightened threshold was in response to the fear of some states
that there would be international intrusion into domestic matters.  See Michael J.
Matheson, ASIL International Law Weekend:  Panel on Internal Conflicts, 3 I.L.S.A. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 523, 523 (1997) (explaining arguments used by nations’
representatives during Geneva Diplomatic Conference before adopting the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions).  For example, some of the Soviet
bloc countries were concerned that additional obligations for internal conflicts
would give “enhanced political and legal status to insurgent groups” and would hold
a state to a higher international standard than the insurgent group it fought.  See id.;
see also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 554, 554-55 (1995) (noting that states’ historical insistence on non-
interference by the international community in internal conflicts limits the reach of
international humanitarian law).
137. Protocol II, supra note 69, at art. 1(1).  Rebel forces must have sufficient
control so as to be able to implement the Protocol, as evidenced by an ability to
detain and provide humane treatment to prisoners and an ability to provide
adequate care to the sick and wounded.  See Junod, supra note 130, at 37 (describing
elements of objective criteria that must be met for Protocol II to apply).
138. See Junod, supra note 130, at 38.  This implies that insurgent armed groups
must be organized, but need not have a rigid hierarchy.  “Unconcerted actions of
isolated individuals” will not suffice.  See id. at 37.
139. See Protocol II, supra note 69, at art. 1(1) (describing parties to whom the
Protocol is applicable).
140. See Junod, supra note 130, at 38 (asserting that insurgents must be capable of
applying the Protocol, that they act under orders of a commander, and that they
actually exercise control over part of the territory).  Press reports indicate a
command structure within the KLA.  See, e.g., Hedges, supra note 47, at A8
(recounting interview with KLA senior commander in farmhouse “headquarters” and
witnessing giving of orders to guerrilla fighters); R. Jeffrey Smith, A Turnaround in
Kosovo, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1998, at A34 (noting KLA checkpoints, commission of
hit and run attacks on pockets of Yugoslav troops, and execution of high ranking
traitors as indications of KLA organization and discipline).
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applied effectively.141
Because there is no express law that prohibits internal
displacement, the involuntary internal displacement of civilians is not
a punishable crime within the Tribunal’s prosecutorial jurisdiction.
Therefore, before the Tribunal may prosecute such conduct, the
civilian displacement must involve:  (1) grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions; (2) war crimes; (3) crimes against humanity; or (4)
genocide.142  The next Part of this Comment will review each category
of crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and determine whether it is
possible to hold an individual criminally responsible for causing
internal displacement.
III. CREATION AND JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA143
The Security Council created the Tribunal with “the sole purpose
of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia” since 1991.144  Though all sides involved in the
Yugoslav conflict committed atrocities, the international community
focused its concern on the Serbian armed forces.145  Even after
Security Council resolutions called for reports146 and investigations147
                                                 
141. See Smith, supra note 140.
142. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 64, at art. 2-5, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note
27, at app. B (codifying subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal).
143. See generally SCHARF, supra note 27, at 51 (recounting the creation of the
Tribunal and its first trial).
144. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at para. 2, U.N. Doc
S/RES/827 (1993).
145. See Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former
Yugoslavia:  The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 235, 236 (1994) (noting that the Serbian practice of ethnic cleansing has
“propelled international humanitarian concern to the forefront of these conflicts”).
Regular media reports of continuing atrocities fueled the public’s demand for an
international response.  See Dûsan Coti, A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 223, 231 (1994) (asserting that the “media war” had
a critical influence in spurring the U.N. to take preventive measures, even though, in
author’s opinion, the media held an anti-Serb bias).
146. See S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., para. 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/771 (1992) (calling on all states and involved humanitarian organizations to
collate “substantiated information” regarding violations of humanitarian law and
make information available to Security Council).
147. See S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., para. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/780 (1992) (requesting that the Commission of Experts be established for
purposes of investigating violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia).
See generally Bassiouni, supra note 62, at 1202 (discussing experiences and problems
in investigating violations of humanitarian law and using the former Yugoslavia as an
example); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 784, 789-92
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of alleged violations of international humanitarian law, many
commentators doubted whether national judicial systems within the
former Yugoslavia could be effective and impartial.148  Consequently,
the Security Council passed Resolution 808 in February, 1993, which
ultimately recognized the occurrence of serious violations of
international humanitarian law.149  The Security Council authorized
the creation of a tribunal in order to “put an end to such crimes and
to take effective measures and bring to justice the persons who are
responsible for them” and to “contribute to the restoration and
maintenance of peace.”150  As of August, 1999, the International
Tribunal publicly indicted eighty suspects for committing war crimes
and crimes against humanity during the Bosnia war.151
In his report on the formation of the Tribunal, the Secretary-
General recommended limiting the applicable law to the rules of
customary international law governing war crimes and crimes against
humanity.152  The rules of customary international humanitarian law
                                                 
(1994) (describing Commission of Experts’ unprecedented authority to investigate
alleged atrocities in the former Yugoslavia compared with prior commissions formed
after World War I and World War II).
148. See O’Brien, supra note 62, at 639.
149. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 317th mtg., para. 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808 (1993) (authorizing the establishment of an ad hoc international
criminal tribunal).
150. See id.  Security Resolution 808 also requested the Secretary-General to
submit a report detailing “all aspects of th[e] matter, including specific proposals”
for “expeditious implementation” of the Security Council’s decision to create an ad
hoc international tribunal.  Id. para. 2.
151. See Jennifer Hentz, News from the International War Crimes Tribunals, 6 HUM.
RTS. BRIEF, Fall 1998, at 7, 7 (summarizing current status of matters pending before
the Tribunal).  The public indictments included 59 Serb defendants, three Muslim
defendants, and 18 Croat defendants, but only 33 indictees were in custody.  See id.
152. See Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 86, para. 34,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1170 (1993) (asserting that the choice of customary law,
over the law of any particular state, avoids the problem of conflicting laws of the
various states); see also International Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugo., List of
Indictments and Indictees (visited Aug. 2, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icty/BLS/
ind.htm>.  Limiting the applicable law to international customary law served a dual
purpose.  First, it avoided future challenges involving state succession to treaties.  See
MORRIS & SCHARF supra note 43, at 51-52 (discussing how the Secretary-General’s
choice of law strengthens Tribunal decisions by providing firm legal standards).
State succession occurs when there is a replacement of one state by another “in
respect of sovereignty over a given territory.”  Brownlie, supra note 100, at 654
(discussing issues that arise from state succession).  When state succession occurs,
questions arise regarding whether the new state has succeeded to treaties, or other
international agreements, signed by the prior state.  See id.  But when such
agreements or multilateral conventions are declaratory of international customary
law, the successor state is automatically bound.  See id. at 669.
Second, the Secretary-General’s recommendation of applying only customary law
was in accordance with the legal principle nullem crimen sine lege, meaning “no one
shall be tried for an act which was not forbidden by law at the time when it was
committed.”  See Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 86, para.
34, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1170 (1993) (explaining meaning of the principle and
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were put forth, according to the Secretary-General,153 in the Geneva
Convention for the Protection of War Victims of August 12, 1949;154
the Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and annexed Regulations of October 18, 1907;155 the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of December 9, 1948;156 and the Nuremberg Charter of
August 8, 1945.157  These documents provide the legal foundation on
which the Tribunal determines whether war crimes or crimes against
humanity occurred.158  A prohibition against internal displacement
must be found within one of these documents for the Tribunal to
hold a head of state, such as Slobodan Milosevic, criminally
responsible for the internal displacement of thousands of Kosovars.
After a brief discussion of the principle of individual criminal
responsibility, each crime within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction will be
applied to the crisis of internal displacement in Kosovo during 1998
to determine whether individuals can be held criminally responsible.
A. Individual Criminal Responsibility
The Nuremberg Treaty and Judgment, which established the
individual responsibility of Nazi leaders for acts committed during
World War II, solidified the principle that an individual who orders
the commission of a war crime is equally guilty for the offense as the
                                                 
its impact on choice of law to be applied by the Tribunal); see also MORRIS & SCHARF,
supra note 43, at 71 (describing the applicable law used by the Tribunal as not solely
limited to those crimes enumerated in the statute); Meron, supra note 112, at 79
(asserting the choice of law deemed applicable and incorporated into the Tribunal’s
statute solidified international humanitarian law as customary law).
153. See Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 86, para. 35,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1170 (1993) (concluding which rules constitute customary
international law).
154. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention of the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection of Civilian
Persons In Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
155. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with
Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 207 Consol. T.S. 277.
156. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (commanding that genocide is a
crime under international law and establishing individual criminal liability).
157. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
158. See Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 86, para. 37,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1170 (1993) (declaring that the Geneva conventions
constitute the basis of the applicable international customary law for the tribunal).
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one who directly committed the act.159  To ensure the criminal
responsibility of those in the chain of command who indirectly
contributed to the commission of war crimes or crimes against
humanity,160 the Secretary-General, in proposing Article 7 of the
Tribunal’s statute, stated that “all persons who participate in the
planning, preparation, or execution of serious violations of
international humanitarian law” contribute to the commission of the
crime and, therefore, are individually responsible for its
commission.161  Individuals in positions of authority, such as Slobodan
Milosevic, can be criminally liable for acts committed by persons
under his command.162  Such acts, which must constitute crimes
within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, are the subject of the following
sections.
B. Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions
1. What are grave breaches?
The first category of crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is
“grave breaches” of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949.  Article 2
of the Tribunal’s statute gives it jurisdiction over such breaches.163
According to the statute, grave breaches include willful killings,
willful causation of great suffering, willful infliction of serious bodily
injury, extensive unlawful and wanton destruction of property not
justified by military necessity, and “unlawful deportation or
transfer.”164  This would appear to provide the Tribunal with
unquestioned ability to prosecute individuals for internal
                                                 
159. See Joyner, supra note 145, at 241 (reviewing principles emerging from the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal).
160. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 43, at 93 (noting the principle of individual
criminal responsibility ensures that all individuals who contributed to a crime’s
commission are held accountable).
161. See Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 86, para. 54,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1174 (1993) (articulating the Secretary-General’s belief
that individuals must be held personally liable for their actions).
162. As stated by the Secretary-General,
[t]his imputed responsibility or criminal negligence is engaged if the person
in superior authority knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were
about to commit or had committed crimes and yet failed to take the
necessary and reasonable steps to prevent or repress the commission of such
crimes or to punish those who had committed them.
Id. para. 56, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1175 (1993).  The Security Council affirmed
this principle in its resolution regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.  See
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res 827
(1993).
163. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 64, at art. 2, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27,
at app. B.
164. See id., reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27, at app. B.
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displacement.  Upon evaluating the legitimacy of its jurisdiction,
however, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal concluded, through
an assessment of the current status of customary international law,
that the crime of “grave breaches” only can apply to acts that occur
within the context of an international armed conflict.165  While
recognizing a trend towards applying grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions to internal armed conflicts, the Appeals Chamber was
reluctant to hold this application as opinio juris of States.166
2. Does the internal displacement of Kosovar citizens constitute a grave
breach?
As previously stated, before an act can be considered a grave
breach of the Geneva Conventions, the act in question must have
occurred during an international conflict.167  It is unlikely that the
armed conflict in the Kosovo province will be considered by the
Tribunal to be international in nature.  According to common Article
2 of the Four Geneva Conventions, an international armed conflict
must involve a declaration of war or an armed conflict between two or
more states.168  The conflict in Kosovo did not involve two states at war
with one another.  The fighting clearly was contained within the
national boundaries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  As a
consequence, no suspect could be held responsible for grave
                                                 
165. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 84 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 60 (1996) (noting that
although there is a trend toward the application of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions to internal conflicts, the current practice of states is insufficient to
justify a finding that grave breaches occur in internal conflicts as well as international
armed conflicts).
166. See id.  Opinio juris generally refers to a general practice of states and the
subjective belief by a state that it is following this general practice because of an
international legal obligation.  See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.;
F.R.G. v. Neth.) (Feb. 20), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 46 (holding elements of opinio juris and
significance of opinio juris in formation of international law).  Opinio juris is one
element of international customary law.  See Brownlie, supra note 100, at 7
(explaining the concept of opinio juris as utilized in the statute of the International
Court).
167. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 84 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 60 (1996).
168. Common Article 2 of the Four Geneva Conventions reads, in part:
[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict that may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
their mutual relations.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 101, at art. 2.
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breaches of the Geneva Conventions for acts committed in Kosovo,
particularly the grave breach of forced deportation or transfer.
C. Crimes Against Humanity
1.  What are crimes against humanity?
The second category of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal is crimes against humanity.169  According to the Tribunal’s
judges, crimes against humanity are “serious acts of violence [that]
harm human beings by striking what is most essential to them:  their
life, liberty, physical welfare, health, and dignity.  It is therefore the
concept of humanity as victim which essentially characterizes crimes
against humanity.”170  The offenses listed as crimes against humanity171
in Article 5 of the Tribunal’s statute are derived from Article 6 of the
Nuremberg Charter, with the addition of rape172 and torture.173
                                                 
169. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 64, at art. 5, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27,
at app. B (establishing the Tribunal’s power to prosecute persons for such crimes).
170. See Prosecutor v. Jean Kabmanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, para. 15 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, 1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1411, 1417 (1998) (quoting the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) (citations omitted).
171. These offenses include “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds,
and other inhumane acts.”  Tribunal Statute, supra note 64, at art. 5, reprinted in
SCHARF, supra note 27, at app. B.  Examples of crimes against humanity in
indictments thus far include: murder, torture, serious physical assault, imprisonment
and persecution of more than 500 civilians, and endangering the health and welfare
of detainees by providing inhumane living conditions.  See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case
No. IT-94-2, paras. 8.1-23.1 (Indictment, Nov. 7, 1994) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugo., 1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 996, 1002-09 (1995) (charging Nikolic
with multiple crimes against humanity, grave breaches, and violations of laws and
customs of war).  In addition, the Tribunal has included targeting of political
leaders, intellectuals, and professionals; shelling and other attacks on civilians;
destruction of homes, businesses, and places of worship; and appropriation and
plunder of real and personal property.  See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5
(Indictment, July 24, 1995) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1995), available
in <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ind-e.htm> (charging Karadzic and
Mladic with crimes against humanity as set out by Article 5 of Tribunal’s statute).
172. Rape and sexual assault are crimes under municipal law and international
criminal law.  See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 85, at 557 (explaining historical
and legal developments supporting the inclusion of rape as a crime against humanity
within Tribunal’s jurisdiction). Much legal analysis and commentary has been written
regarding the prosecution of rape as a war crime.  See generally MASS RAPE:  THE WAR
AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994) (providing
factual accounts and essays about rape in time of war); Theodore Meron, Rape as a
Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 424 (1993) (advocating
increased recognition of rape as war crime or grave breach under international
humanitarian law); Diane Orentlicher, Sexual Assault Issues Before the War Crimes
Tribunal, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 1997, at 8, 8-9 (recounting brief history of rape
prosecutions and highlighting practical challenges of obtaining evidence and
achieving arrest).
173. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), modified, 24
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Crimes against humanity can occur domestically, within a country’s
borders, or internationally, across state lines.174  The alleged acts must
be aimed at a civilian population.175  The acts also must be committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack176 on national, political,
ethnic, religious, or racial grounds.177  Discriminatory intent is an
essential element of these crimes.178  Although the crimes in question
must involve a “course of conduct,” a single act can constitute a crime
against humanity if it can be linked to a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population.179  There need not be a formal
policy to commit crimes against humanity, as a “policy” may be
inferred from the widespread and systematic nature of the acts.180  In
addition, “the perpetrator must have knowledge of the wider context
in which his act occurs.”181  In other words, the act must be part of a
                                                 
I.L.M. 535 (1985) (prohibiting torture as a means to promote the U.N. principle of
universal respect for human rights).
174. See Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 86, at para. 47
n.9, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1173 (1993) (“[P]rohibitions contained in common
article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions cannot be breached in an armed conflict,
regardless of whether it is international or internal in character.”) (citing Nicaragua
v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986)).
175. See id. para. 47 (defining fundamental characteristics of crimes against
humanity).  The Tribunal has given a broad interpretation as to who constitutes a
civilian under this article.  See Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 462, 464 (1998) (discussing Tribunal’s broad interpretation of “civilian”).
People “actively involved in a resistance movement” can qualify as victims of crimes
against humanity, as shown in one matter in which resistance fighters put down their
arms.  See Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic, Radic & Sljivancanin, Case No. 95-13-R61 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1996), cited in Meron, supra, at 464 (determining
that resistance fighters not actively participating in an armed conflict can be
considered “civilians” for purposes of the statute’s article).
176. See Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 86, para. 48, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159,
1173 (1993) (defining scope of crimes against humanity).  The “or” was strongly
supported by the Tribunal in both the 1997 Tadic case and the 1996 Mrksic, Radic &
Sljivancanin case.  See Meron, supra note 175, at 464-65 (emphasizing Tribunal’s role
in clarifying definition of crimes against humanity).
177. See Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 86, at para. 48,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1173 (1993) (noting that “such inhumane acts have taken
the form of so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’” in the former Yugoslavia).
178. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, para. 651 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugo., 1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 944 (1997) (adopting
requirement of discriminatory intent for all crimes of humanity under Article 5 of
the Statute).
179. See id. para. 649, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 943 (1997) (holding that a single
act, as part of a widespread, systematic attack against a civilian population, may
constitute a crime against humanity).
180. See id. para. 653, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 944 (1997) (finding that a policy
pursued against a group of people can be “deduced from the way in which the acts
occur”).  In addition, the Tribunal does not require a state policy of committing
crimes against humanity as did the Nuremberg Tribunal.  See Meron, supra note 175,
at 465 (explaining that customary law now includes organized groups that may have
gained de facto control over defined territory).
181. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, paras. 624-659  (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugo., 1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908, 937-46 (1997) (establishing the
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widespread, discriminatory attack, and the perpetrator must be aware
of his act as only one of many committed against similar victims.
2. Does the internal displacement in Kosovo constitute a crime against
humanity?
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter included deportation as a
crime against humanity, but did not include internal displacement.182
Use of the word “deportation” appears to denote a purposeful
governmental action and policy of transferring people across national
boundaries.  The Prosecutor of the Tribunal included forcible
transfer of persons during the Yugoslav War in indictments for crimes
against humanity, alleging persons were
systematically arrested and interned in detention facilities . . . and
thereafter unlawfully deported or transferred to locations inside
and outside of the [state] . . . civilians, including women, children,
and elderly persons, were taken directly from their homes and
eventually used in prisoner exchanges . . . these deportations and
others were not conducted as evacuations for safety, military
necessity, or for any other lawful purpose, and have . . . resulted in
a significant reduction or elimination of Bosnia Muslims and
Bosnia Croats in certain occupied regions.183
In other words, only if the Yugoslav government practiced forced
relocation during 1998, could an individual be held criminally
responsible for population transfer.  Because no evidence existed that
the Yugoslav government forcibly relocated or deported ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo during the time period in question, the Tribunal
could not convict Slobodan Milosevic for the internal displacement
of Kosovo citizens as a crime against humanity.184  
                                                 
Tribunal’s conditions of applicability for crimes against humanity).
182. See de Zayas, supra note 69, at 221 (asserting that prohibition of mass
deportations as crimes against humanity also would apply to civil wars).
183. Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5, para. 25 (Indictment, July 24, 1995)
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1995), available in
<http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ind-e.htm>.
184. The specific acts that created internal displacement might be successfully
prosecuted as crimes against humanity, but not because they caused internal
displacement, which is the focus of this Comment.  The number of attacks on
Kosovar civilians, and the proportion of the population that was displaced as a result
of those attacks, demonstrates the widespread and systematic character of
governmental actions.  That the vast majority of internally displaced persons were of
Albanian ethnicity shows a probable discriminatory intent on the part of the Serb-
controlled Yugoslav government.  Nevertheless, the number of displaced persons
might include those who fled their homes in fear of being attacked, but who were
not actually attacked.
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D. Genocide
1.  What is genocide?
The Tribunal has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
individuals suspected of committing genocide.185  In 1993, the
Secretary-General declared the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”)
to be customary international law, citing an advisory opinion by the
International Court of Justice.186  Although the Genocide Convention
indicates that genocide can occur at any time during war or peace,187
the Tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction for this crime is confined to
genocidal acts during armed conflict.188  Those who commit genocide
can be held liable regardless of whether they are “constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”189  Two
essential elements compose the crime of genocide:  (1) a prohibited
act,190 and (2) the specific intent to destroy “in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”191  Acts cannot be sporadic
                                                 
185. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 65, at art. 4, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27,
at app. B (setting out acts that could constitute genocide).  Article 4 of the Tribunal’s
statute states:
2.  Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnic, racial or religious group, as
such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  3.
The following acts shall be punishable:  (a) genocide, (b) conspiracy to
commit genocide, (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide, (d)
attempt to commit genocide, (e) complicity in genocide.
Id.
186. See Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 86, at para. 45,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1173 (1993) (citing Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 23 (May 28)).
Article IX of the Genocide Convention provides for disputes involving interpretation
or application of the Convention to be referred by a party to the dispute to the
International Court of Justice.  See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, art. IX, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 (1951)
[hereinafter Genocide Convention] (granting limited jurisdiction to International
Court of Justice).
187. Genocide Convention, supra note 186, at art. I (confirming genocide as a
crime under international law).
188. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited because of its creation under the U.N.
Security Council’s Chapter VII powers.  See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 43, at 83-84
(discussing reasons why the Tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity is limited to armed conflicts).
189. See Genocide Convention, supra note 186, at art IV.
190. See id. art. II (listing prohibited acts).
191. Tribunal Statute, supra note 64, at art. 4(2), reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27,
at app. B.  Article 4 of the International Tribunal’s statute was taken verbatim from
Articles 2 and 3 of the Genocide Convention.  See Report on Establishing an
278 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:243
or coincidental, and must be carried out by an organized group
controlled by an official policy.192  At this writing, the Tribunal has yet
to convict anyone of genocide.193
2. Does the internal displacement in Kosovo constitute genocide?
The Genocide Convention contains no specific provision regarding
internal displacement or forced transfer of civilians.194  Thus, a
factual, rather than legal, assessment of the displacement of ethnic
Albanians controls the Tribunal’s determination of whether acts were
committed with the intent to destroy the ethnic Albanian population.
The fact that ethnic Albanians constitute a large majority within the
province of Kosovo195 makes the number of people displaced in 1998
significant.  Arguably, the condition of internal displacement can
prevent births, cause serious bodily or mental harm, and bring about
a group’s physical destruction.196  Genocide, however, requires a
“specific invidious intent”197 to destroy a group, not simply an intent
                                                 
International Tribunal, supra note 86, at paras. 45-46, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1173
(1993) (referring authoritatively to the Genocide Convention).
192. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 43, at 87 (citing an example where evidence
of organized, non-sporadic ethnic cleansing sufficiently established systemitization).
193. Milan Kovacevic, Vice President of the Serbian Democratic Party’s Crisis Staff
of Prijedor, became the first suspect tried for genocide.  His trial began July 6, 1998.
See generally Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, Case No. IT-97-24 (Initial Indictment March 13,
1997) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1997), available in <http://www.un.
org/icty/indictment/ind-e.htm>; Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, Case No. IT-97-24 (First
Amendment June 23, 1998) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1997), available
in <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/ind-e.htm>.
The first judgment by an international court for the crime of genocide occurred
September 2, 1998, when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found
Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty of nine counts of genocide.  See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 51-55 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1998), reprinted in  37
I.L.M. 1399, 1408 (1998).  The Trial Chamber found that Akayesu intended to
eradicate the Tutsi group as a whole, since even newborn babies were victims of the
killing.  Id. para. 17.  The majority of victims were non-combatants.  Id. para. 19.  The
Trial Chamber also found that Akayesu incited genocide in a public gathering by
calling on those in attendance to work together to eliminate the sole enemy, Tutsis.
Id. para. 29.  Akayesu also was found guilty of superior criminal responsibility.  Id.
paras. 26, 32, 34.  For a summary of the judgment, see International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, Press Release, Rwanda Int’l Crim. Trib. Pronounces Guilty Verdict
in Historic Genocide Trial (Sept. 2, 1998) <http://www.un.org/ictr/english/
pressrel/PR138.htm>.
194. See Genocide Convention, supra note 186, at arts. I-XIX (stating provisions for
prosecution of crime of genocide).
195. See O’Connor, supra note 51, at A3 (reporting that 90% of the population of
Kosovo is ethnic Albanian).
196. See id. (quoting U.N. officials regarding the serious health problems
confronting the ethnic Albanian refugees).
197. Christopher L. Blakesley, Atrocity and Its Prosecution: The Ad Hoc Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 189, 209 (Timothy L. H. McCormack & Gerry Simpson
eds., 1997).
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to kill.198  If Tribunal defendants can demonstrate that armed efforts
were made in 1998 to regain territory that KLA forces previously
seized, and not to destroy ethnic Albanians, the requisite mens rea
would not be present.199  Without clear proof of the requisite intent,
the internal displacement of Kosovo civilians does not constitute
genocide.
E. Violations of Laws and Customs of War
1. What is a violation of laws and customs of war?
Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute provides the Tribunal jurisdiction
over war crimes200 involving acts committed in violation of the laws or
customs of war.201  This article is grounded in international
humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict, both of which are in
part embodied in the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and Annexed Regulations.202  The
Nuremberg Tribunal recognized the 1907 Hague Convention as
declaratory of international customary law.203  The Nuremberg
Tribunal also determined that violations of these laws constituted
crimes for which persons could be held individually responsible.204
                                                 
198. See id. (discussing difficulties in proving genocide in Rwandan and Former
Yugoslav Tribunals).
199. See O’Connor, supra note 51, at A3 (reporting a government-led offensive was
announced as “a fairly limited operation to reclaim major roads from rebel control”).
200. The term “war crime” refers both to the specific crime of violating the laws
and customs of war, as well as to the general category of international crimes
encompassing violations of the four Geneva Conventions.  See 3 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 5 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987) (explaining that differentiation of
the specific term “war crimes” from the general category of war crimes was a
necessary outgrowth of Nuremberg once the new crime of “crimes against humanity”
was created).
201. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 64, at art. 3, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27,
at app. B (listing violations of the laws or customs of war).  Article 3 states that:
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:  (a) employment of
poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity; (c) attack or bombardment, by whatever
means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; (d) seizure of,
destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion,
charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works
of art and science; (e) plunder of public or private property.
Id.
202. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and annexed Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 227, T.S. No. 539.
203. See Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 86, at para. 42,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1171 (1993) (explaining that the Nuremberg Tribunal
recognized provisions of Hague Regulations as declaratory of current laws and
customs of war).
204. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 43, at 69-70 (describing legal precedents
supplied by Nuremberg Charter and subsequently applied by the Nuremberg
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Violations of the laws and customs of war are acts that violate the
rules of armed conflict established by international customary law.205
Alleged crimes must be committed during an internal or
international armed conflict.206  Article 3 of the Tribunal’s Statute can
be used to address violations of international humanitarian law that
do not fall under the other articles of the Tribunal’s subject-matter
jurisdiction, i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions.207
Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II also fall under Article 3 of the Tribunal Statute.208
Examples of acts committed during the Yugoslav War determined to
be violations of the laws or customs of war, as recognized by common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, include the following:  torture
and physical beatings as punishment209 and during interrogations,210
physical assaults,211 willful killing,212 enslavement,213 plunder of civilian
private property,214 destruction of sacred sites,215 use of civilians as
human shields,216 and deliberate civilian attacks,217 through sniper
                                                 
Tribunal).
205. See Joyner, supra note 145, at 238 (defining war crimes).
206. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 86 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 60 (1996) (noting
that “violations of the laws or customs of war” originally was a term of art referring to
the previously prevailing “laws of warfare” concept; today, however, the phrase refers
to armed conflict and the idea of an international law of armed conflict).
207. See id., reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 60 (1996) (“Article 3 may be taken to cover all
violations of international humanitarian law other than the ‘grave breaches’ of the
four Geneva Conventions falling under Article 2 (or, for that matter, the violations
covered by Articles 4 and 5 [of the Tribunal Statute]).”).
208. See Tribunal Statute, supra note 64, at art. 3, reprinted in SCHARF, supra note 27,
at app. B (identifying violations of laws and customs of war).
209. See Prosecutor v. Kronjelac, Case No. IT-97-25-I, paras. 5.13–5.16 (Indictment,
June 17, 1997) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1997), available in
<http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/60697-25.htm> detailing Krnojelac’s
offenses and citing relevant authority for their prosecution).
210. See id. paras. 5.17 – 5.26 (citing eight instances of such torture).
211. See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, paras. 3.4, 8.4, 9.2, 11.2, 14.2,
15.2, 16.2, 17.2, 18.2, 19.2  (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1994), reprinted in
34 I.L.M. 996, 999, 1002-07 (1995) (citing multiple physical assaults as violations of
the laws or customs of war).
212. See Prosecutor v. Kronjelac, Case No. IT-97-25-I, paras. 5.27-5.29 (Indictment,
June 17, 1997) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1997), available in
<http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/ine-e.htm> (finding Krnojelac guilty of willful
killing).
213. See id. paras. 5.36-5.41 (charging Krnojielac with crimes of forced labor
during the Yugoslav War).
214. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5, paras. 27-28 (Indictment, July 24,
1995) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1995), available in
<http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ine-e.htm>.
215. See id. paras. 36-39.
216. See id. paras. 47-48 (recounting examples of using humans as shields).
217. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, para. 8 (Second Amended
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fire, mortars, rockets, and artillery.218  At this writing, the Tribunal
Prosecutor has not filed charges for violations of the laws and
customs of war based on Additional Protocol II.219  
The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal enumerated conditions that
must be fulfilled for an act to constitute a violation of the laws and
customs of war under Article 3.220  First, the act must be in violation of
a rule of international humanitarian law.221  Second, the rule violated
must be “customary in nature” or belong to a treaty to which the State
of the accused is a party.222  Third, the violation must be a breach of a
rule “protecting important values” and involve “grave consequences
for the victim.”223  Fourth, customary or conventional law must
provide for individual criminal responsibility if an individual violates
the rule.224
2. Is the internal displacement in Kosovo a violation of laws and customs of
war?
The International Criminal Tribunal has held that Article 3 is a
“catch-all” for violations of international humanitarian laws that do
not fall within the ambit of other statutory provisions dealing with
grave breaches, genocide, or crimes against humanity.225  This
includes violations of common Article 3 and appears to include
violations of Additional Protocol II.226  In supporting inclusion of
                                                 
Indictment, April 25, 1997) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1997), available
in <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ine-e.htm> (accusing Blaskic of
planning and ordering civilian attacks).
218. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5, para. 36 (Indictment, July 24,
1995) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., 1995), available in
<http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ine-e.htm> (alleging the shelling of
civilian gatherings and the terrorizing of Sarajevo civilians through the use of sniper
fire).
219. But see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 49 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda, 1998), reprinted in  37 I.L.M. 1399, 1407 (1998) (holding that
Additional Protocol II supports and complements common Article 3, which is part of
international customary law and, therefore, relevant in similar decisions).
220. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 94-95 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 62 (1996)
(stating the requirements that must be met for a violation to be subject to Tribunal
prosecution regardless of whether the armed conflict is international or domestic in
nature).
221. See id., reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 62 (1996).
222. See id., reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 62 (1996) (requiring that if the rule is in a
treaty it must be “unquestionably binding” on the party and not a derogation from
international customary law in order for conviction to hold).
223. Id., reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 62 (1996).
224. See id., reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 62 (1996).
225. See id., reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 62 (1996) (stating Article 3 of the Tribunal
statute covers violations of humanitarian law not covered by other articles of the
statute).
226. See id., reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 61 (stating Article 3 is a “general clause” that
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Protocol II, then-Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline
Albright stated on record that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over
internal conflicts included violations of common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II.227  The Tribunal must assess the status of each
applicable provision of Protocol II to determine if the Protocol in its
entirety has attained the status of customary international law.
As stated above, the Appeals Chamber established the
requirements that an international rule must satisfy before a breach
of that rule would violate the law and customs of war.  First, the
international humanitarian law or rule allegedly violated must be
customary law or belong to a treaty to which the state is a party.228  To
address this requirement, the FRY has asserted succession to the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”).229  Assuming this is
legally valid, Protocol II could be binding on FRY in light of the SFRY
Parliament’s ratification of both Additional Protocols in 1978230 and
the SFRY constitutional provision, which dictates the application of
international treaties in domestic courts.231
                                                 
covers “violations of common Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions] and other
customary rules on internal conflicts”).
227. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 215th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, at 15 (1993)
(statement of Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.), quoted in Meron,
supra note 112, at 80 (referring to Ambassador Albright’s affirmative statement as
clarification of Tribunal’s jurisdiction, but not to status of Additional Protocols as
international customary law).
228. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 62 (1996).
229. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994)
(noting FRY’s assertion of succession to SFRY).
230. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 94-95 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 62 (1996)
(noting ratification as evidence toward conclusion that “customary international law
imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common Article 3”).
231. This constitutional provision has the effect of incorporating international
treaties into the former Yugoslavia’s domestic criminal law, thereby creating
individual criminal responsibility.  See YUGO. CONST. art. 210, reprinted in THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD 427, 510 (William B. Simons ed., 1980)
(“International treaties which have been promulgated shall be directly applied by the
courts of law.”); see also Meron, supra note 112, at 82-83 (asserting that Tribunal
could prosecute for violations of common Article 3 even if international
criminalization of violations were not well-established in international law because of
incorporation of common Article 3 into Yugoslav municipal law).  In addition, the
SFRY is a signatory of the U.N. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.  See U.N. Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, art. I(b), adopted and opened for signature Dec. 16, 1968, U.N. GAOR, 23rd
Sess., Agenda Item 55, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2391 (XXIII), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68, 70
(1969).  This Convention, which went into effect November 11, 1970, states that an
individual will be held criminally responsible for:
eviction by armed attack or occupation and inhuman acts resulting from the
policy of apartheid [sic], and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948
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If the Tribunal determines that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
is not a party to Additional Protocol II, the first element of this crime
could still be met if Article 17(2) of Additional Protocol II, which
prohibits “compelling displacement,” attains the level of international
customary law.  The Official Commentary on Protocol II states that
the Protocol is based on “rules of universal validity to which States
can be held.”232  The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal declared that
“many provisions” of Protocol II are presently “declaratory of existing
rules or as having crystallized emerging rules of customary law.”233
The Appeals Chamber did not expressly include Article 17(2) in a list
of provisions that had attained the status of customary law, but also
did not indicate the list was exhaustive.234  The Security Council, in
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda shortly
after the creation of the Tribunal, expressly included serious
violations of common Article 3, the Geneva Conventions, and of
Additional Protocol II as prosecutorial crimes, arguably indicating its
acknowledgment of Protocol II as customary law.  In a recent report,
however, the UN Secretary-General admitted that, in creating the
Rwanda Tribunal, the Security Council used “a more expansive
approach to the choice of applicable law” by including violations of
Additional Protocol II, “which, as a whole, has not yet been
universally recognized as part of customary international law”
                                                 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of a
country in which they were committed.
Id. (emphasis added).  The amount of emphasis placed on the word “or” in this
passage will determine if the eviction by armed attack must be committed in the
context of apartheid.
232. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 113, at para. 1340.  Protocol II “contains
virtually all the irreducible rights of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights . . . .  These rights are based on rules of universal validity to which states can
be held, even in the absence of any treaty obligation or any explicit commitment on
their part.”  Id.
233. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 67 (1996).  But see
Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994),
cited in BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 85, at 508 (asserting probability that
common Article 3 was a statement of customary international law, but expressing
doubt that Additional Protocol II would be similarly viewed).
234. The provisions noted by the Tribunal included prohibitions on violence
against persons who are not taking an active part in hostilities, punishment in the
absence of due process, and the taking of hostages.  See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-AR72, para. 117 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., App. Chamber,
1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 67 (1996) (referring to comments made by Deputy
Legal Advisor of U.S. Department of State regarding status of provisions of
Additional Protocol II as international customary law) (quoting Michael J. Matheson,
Humanitarian Law Conference, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 430-31 (1987)).
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entailing individual criminal responsibility.235
The second condition that must be fulfilled for an act to constitute
a violation of the laws and customs of war is that the violation must
cause grave consequences for the victim and breach a rule that
protects important values.236  Values held collectively by the
international community arguably are reflected in international
human rights law,237 and specifically, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights238 (“Universal Declaration”) and the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).239
The Universal Declaration “‘proclaims’ a comprehensive set of
rights as a ‘common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations,’”240 and its provisions codify existing international customary
law.241  It is widely considered to be an “authoritative interpretation”
of the obligations of Member States under the United Nations
Charter.242  The Universal Declaration specifically provides for the
right of “freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
                                                 
235. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council
Resolution 995 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/134, para. 12 (1995)
(stating common Article 3 is criminalized for the first time), quoted in Meron, supra
note 136, at 558 (advocating for international criminalization of common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II).
236. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 62 (1996).  The
Appeals Chamber provided this example:  the stealing of a loaf of bread, which
technically violates the Hague and customary rule that “private property must be
respected,” does not constitute a violation of international humanitarian law because
it does not produce grave consequences for the victim.  See id., reprinted in 35 I.L.M.
32, 62 (1996).
237. See R. J. VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9 (1986)
(“The subjects of human rights are not members of this or that society, but of the
community of humankind.”).
238. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration].
239. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted  Dec. 16,
1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
240. de Zayas, supra note 74, at 267 (reviewing Universal Declaration provisions
that are implicated in forced displacement).
241. For commentary on the status of the Universal Declaration as customary law,
see Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 1,
5-7 (1986), which discusses language used in the Universal Declaration, how it has
been duplicated in other human rights documents, and whether the language and
attached meaning have attained status of customary international law, and Jonathan
L. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 549 (1993), which
notes the Universal Declaration as an example of international customary law).
242. The Charter of the United Nations provides the foundation upon which the
body of international human rights laws are based: all Members “pledge themselves”
to promote and achieve “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms.”  See UNITED NATIONS CHARTER arts. 55, 56, quoted in COHEN &
DENG, supra note 2, at 78-79 (discussing human rights laws that apply to internally
displaced persons).
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each [Member] State.”243  The ICCPR, ratified by 132 nations, grants
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one’s
residence.244  From both of these documents, one can infer a
collectively-held value of freedom of movement.245  Although these
human rights documents relate to the behavior of states and not to
the behavior of individuals,246 Article 17 of Additional Protocol II can
be considered a “rule protecting important values.”  Internal
displacement can produce “grave consequences” for victims,
including separation from family members, lack of basic necessities
for life, and the disorganization of community structures.247  In sum,
the second element of a violation of the laws and customs of war
could be met.
As the last condition for a violation of the laws and customs of war,
the Tribunal dictated that custom or conventional law must provide
for individual responsibility for violations of that law, in this case,
Article 17 of Additional Protocol II.  There is precedent for holding
individuals responsible for the forcible deportations of civilians.
“Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter defined ‘war crimes’ to
                                                 
243. See Universal Declaration, supra note 238, at art. 13(1); see also COHEN &
DENG, supra note 2, at 78 (“[A]n individual right against forced displacement
arguable inheres in the freedom of movement and residence set forth, inter alia, in
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”).  The Universal
Declaration also provides for the right to “life, liberty, and security of person” in
Article 3 as well as the right to be free from arbitrary interference with privacy,
family, home, or correspondence in Article 12.  See Universal Declaration, supra note
238, at arts. 3, 12.
244. See ICCPR, supra note 239, at art. 12(1) (“Everyone lawfully within the
territory of a state shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.”).  However, restrictive clauses contained in
the ICCPR serve to limit human rights guarantees for internally displaced persons, as
a state may derogate from some provisions “in time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation,” to protect public safety, or in order to restore public
order.  See id. art. 4(1) (providing that government measures are not discriminatory
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, language, or “social origin”).  Although the
determination of a state of emergency is made by a national government,
international standards have developed that provide procedural and substantive
requirements that must be met before a derogation from the ICCPR is considered
justifiable.  See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 87 (noting derogation from the
ICCPR must be in response to an important public or social need, in pursuit of a
legitimate governmental aim, and must be proportionate to that aim).  Every
derogation requires a “precise balancing” of the right to freedom of movement and
the government’s interests in interfering with that right.  See id.
245. Some argue these provisions indicate a human right to be free from forced
displacement.  See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 78 (asserting rights against
forcible displacement are inherent in rights to freedom of movement and
residence).
246. See INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 610 (Louis Henkin et al. eds.,
3d ed. 1993) (noting that states are held responsible for maintaining a policy that
encourages or condones violations of human rights).
247. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 2, at 24-26 (describing the significant impact of
displacement).
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include ‘murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied
territory.’”248  The forced mass deportations and expulsions across
national boundaries were prosecuted as war crimes for which
individuals were criminally liable.249  Yet, if a population transfer is a
crime in an international context, it logically would follow that the
same transfer would be a crime in an internal conflict.250  The
Tribunal itself stated, “[W]hat is inhuman and consequently
proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and
inadmissible in civil strife.”251
The internal displacement of ethnic Albanians during 1998 does
not easily meet the necessary criteria for a violation of the laws and
customs of war.  It is not clear whether the Tribunal’s Prosecutor
could convict Slobodan Milosevic for causing the displacement if
such conviction would require an “expansive interpretation of its
jurisdiction.”252
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal was created because of a “moral imperative” to
prosecute persons responsible for egregious violations of
international humanitarian law.253  The Tribunal recognized its
                                                 
248. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis between the United States, France, Great Britain, and the
Soviet Union, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544, art. 6(b) (defining war
crimes); see also de Zayas, supra note 74, at 283-84 (describing the jurisprudence that
emerged from the Nuremberg Trials).
249. See de Zayas, supra note 74, at 283-84 (explaining that the Nuremberg
suspects were charged with forced expulsions and mass deportations of civilian
populations).
250. See id. at 221 (asserting that the act of transferring should be dispositive
rather than the act of crossing national boundaries).
251. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 119 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 68 (1996)
(referring to means and methods of warfare).
252. As one author noted:
There is an important reason for the Tribunal to exercise greater caution in
construing its jurisdiction: States will not have faith in the integrity of the
Tribunal as a precedent for other ad hoc tribunals and for a permanent
international criminal court if the Tribunal is perceived as prone to
expansive interpretations of its jurisdiction.
Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 305, 307 (1997) (discussing how the concept of individual responsibility for
violations of Geneva Conventions and the additional Protocols could constitute
progressive development of international law).
253. The Tribunal was intended to serve the purposes of educating the general
public as to events that occurred, providing a record of atrocities, and, mostly
importantly, deterring future commission of similarly brutal crimes.  See Theodor
Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 122 (1993)
(emphasizing the awesome importance of criminally prosecuting individuals
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“primary purpose” as “not to leave unpunished any person guilty of
any serious violation, whatever the context within which it may have
been committed.”254  Suspects have been prosecuted for forced
expulsion in compliance with a purposeful government policy.255
Based on the above analysis, however, successfully prosecuting
individuals such as Slobodan Milosevic for causing the internal
displacement of thousands of ethnic-Albanians during 1998 probably
will be unsuccessful.  At that time, Milosevic was not relying on the
previously utilized method of forced relocation as was utilized during
the Yugoslav War, possibly because he knew to avoid legally
indefensible acts.256  Through the government’s use of limited armed
                                                 
responsible for atrocities in order to deter the future commission of similar crimes).
One could argue that the goal of deterrence has not been met, in light of the
Yugoslav government leaders’ decisions to use armed force against ethnic Albanians
in the province of Kosovo despite indictments and convictions of war criminals.  See
supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
254. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 92 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugo., App. Chamber, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 61 (1996); see also
Meron, supra note 253, at 122 (“The credibility of international humanitarian law
demands a war crimes tribunal to hold accountable those responsible for gross
violations in the former Yugoslavia.”).  For a discussion of broad reasons why
continued impunity for international crimes continues, see generally Madeline H.
Morris, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental
Human Rights: International Guidelines Against Impunity:  Facilitating Accountability, 59 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB. 29, 30 (1996) (citing political constraints, lack of resources, and
lack of national and international will as reasons why full, international
accountability does not occur).
255. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 72.
256. Julie Mertus, Remarks at the Conference entitled Myths & Realities About
Ethnic Conflict in Kosovo (Dec. 17, 1998).  There was no evidence of extensive
civilian roundups or forced population transfers as had occurred during the Yugoslav
war.  See Associated Press, Fleeing Ethnic Albanians Tell of Kosovo Offensive, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1998, at A4 (reporting fears that Kosovo conflict will develop into “another
Bosnia”).  But see Perlez, supra note 52, at A1 (stating that two alleged massacres of
ethnic Albanians which occurred on September 26, 1998, are of particular import to
the Tribunal).  The numbers of victims during the Yugoslav war were considerably
larger, although perhaps simply due to the size of the population relative to the
territory in which the armed conflict took place.  Compare Prosecutor v. Drazen
Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22, para. 23 (Sentencing Judgment, March 5, 1998) (Int’l
Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugo. 1996) available in
<http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/trialc/judgment/erd-tsj980305e.htm>
(convicted for taking part in the mass execution of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim
civilians), and Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Radic, Sljivancanin, Case No. IT-95-13a, para. 9,
13 (Indictment, Nov. 7, 1995) available in <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/ind-
e.htm> (charged with seizure of 300 men and the beating and killing of 200 men),
with Guy Dinmore, Villagers Slaughtered in Kosovo ‘Atrocity,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1998,
at A1 (reporting mutilated bodies of 46 ethnic-Albanians found in mass grave and
included a young woman, a 12-year-old boy, and many older men).
At one point during 1998, Serbian military tactics responded to foreign criticism.
After much criticism from the West for allowing approximately 50,000 displaced
people to live in the outdoors, Serbian police invited residents of Vranici, who had
fled after warning shots were fired on their village the previous day, to return to their
homes, emphasizing their safety upon doing so.  See Perlez, supra note 52, at A14
(detailing potential testimonial evidence that could be used for prosecution of war
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attacks under the guise of ferreting out rebels, civilians preferred to
flee the area rather than surrender themselves to the government
forces and forcibly be transported to another location.257
Clearly, an express prohibition of internal displacement must be
constructed in light of the inadequacy of existing laws.  “Prohibition
would be more meaningful if the prohibition came from positive law
in a rule explicitly about transfer.”258 Although Yugoslav government
leaders could not be held criminally responsible for internal
displacement under nullem crimen sine lege, the problem of internal
displacement continues to persist globally.259  If enforcement of an
express prohibition against internal displacement existed,
government leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic would be deterred in
the future from pursuing actions that result in internal displacement.
                                                 
crimes).  The villagers were bused back to their village, only to find their vehicles and
farm equipment burned or vandalized.  See id.  This police operation appeared to be
“designed to create chaos and fear,” but also to insure those who fled did not remain
in the forest.  See id.
257. At times, Yugoslav government forces subsequently entered the area and
destroyed property, possibly in order to render the area uninhabitable.  See Mike
O’Connor, Kosovo Assault Steps Up, Making Thousands More Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 1998, at A3 (quoting foreign monitor’s concerns of the use of “ethnic cleansing”
by government forces against ethnic Albanians).  If such tactics by the Yugoslav
government are proven to be intentional methods to thwart civilians’ efforts to
return home, then these governmental acts could fall under the rubric of ethnic
cleansing.
258. Goebel, supra note 20, at 41 (asserting a positive law regarding internal
population transfers would decrease effectiveness of “state sovereignty” defense).
One recommendation made by Francis Deng, author of Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, is for an international criminal court to reinforce a right not to be
arbitrarily displaced by issuing judgments against unlawful displacement.  See COHEN
& DENG, supra  note 2, at 251 (proposing strategies and methods to prevent
displacement).  But such a court would need to resolve the difficulty raised here of
the inadequacy of current international law.
259. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
